

Bangladesh National University Public Service Semester Program

One compulsory semester of direct government service for university students, required for graduation, financed by universities under existing fee structures.

A comprehensive, evidence-based proposal covering the national higher-education and government-service mapping, the university-funded financial model, legal and regulatory requirements, phased implementation, anti-corruption safeguards, and monitoring framework — built on 123 registered sources across three research phases.

Program abbreviation: NUPSSP

PREPARED FOR REVIEW BY THE MINISTRY OF EDUCATION, THE UNIVERSITY GRANTS COMMISSION OF BANGLADESH, RELEVANT MINISTRIES, PUBLIC AND PRIVATE UNIVERSITIES

OCTOBER 2026 · EVIDENCE PACKAGE A–L ATTACHED

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1. Executive Summary

This proposal presents the Bangladesh National University Public Service Semester Program (NUPSSP): one compulsory semester of direct, supervised service in government offices, completed by every eligible undergraduate and graduate student as a condition of graduation. The program is financed under a strict baseline rule mandated by the sponsoring policy: universities bear the costs of implementation, students continue paying only their existing semester and university fees under existing fee structures, no new compulsory student fee is created, and no new government appropriation is assumed. The proposal is built on three completed research phases: a verified national higher-education and government-employment database (45 sources), a feasibility research phase on the service-semester concept (54 sources), and this final phase's university-finance investigation (24 additional sources). Every figure presented is labeled as a verified fact, a derived estimate, or a planning assumption, and 123 sources are registered in the accompanying database.

Three headline findings frame the decision. First, the demand base: the direct-university final-year pool is approximately 130,178 students per year (52,651 in public teaching universities and 77,527 in private universities, CSV 12). A 300,000-participant national program would exceed this pool by 169,822 students, requiring compulsory participation by National University affiliated-college students. Second, the funding finding: under the university-funded baseline, per-participant university cash cost is estimated at BDT 7,567 to 16,033 per year (CSV 29), or BDT 75.7 to 160.3 crore annually at a 100,000-participant scale. This is approximately 0.3 to 0.6 percent of the public university system budget (BDT 10,802 crore, FY2025-26 revised) and 0.7 to 3.1 percent of estimated private-sector tuition revenue, and is therefore conditionally affordable for most public universities and strong private universities. Third, the structural finding: National University colleges cannot bear program costs under any defensible reading of the baseline, because the National University operates on BDT 795.55 per student per year (UGC 50th Annual Report) and its approximately 2,500 affiliated colleges are separately financed fee-dependent institutions. Including them would consume roughly 64 percent of the National University's entire UGC transfer.

The proposal therefore recommends a phased program that is honestly scaled to the evidence: a legal-preparation phase, a pilot of 10 to 15 universities and 5,000 to 10,000 students, expansion across direct public and financially capable private universities toward a steady-state ceiling of approximately 130,000 participants per year, and an explicit national decision point on National University participation that would require a departure from the baseline funding rule. The program design includes a transparent government seat-allocation formula, a discipline-matched placement system across 14 government sectors, anti-corruption safeguards that assign students no enforcement powers, a monitoring and evaluation framework with 19 indicators, and 24 registered risks with mitigations. The proposal claims no unproven corruption-reduction benefits and no government savings: no such savings are counted anywhere in the financial model.

Decisions requested: (1) approve the NUPSSP design and phased roadmap; (2) direct drafting of an enabling law for national compulsory scope; (3) issue a UGC budget-line circular authorizing service-program expenditures within existing public-university grants; (4) approve the pilot with 10-15 universities; (5) defer the National University question to the Phase 3 review gate.

2. Background and National Context

Bangladesh operates one of the larger higher-education systems in the world by enrollment. The verified institutional database (CSV 1) records 173 UGC-recognized universities as of 2025: 63 public universities including the National University and Bangladesh Open University, 108 private universities, and 2 international universities. More recent budget documents count 56 to 57 public universities receiving UGC allocations in FY2025-26 and the press reports 116 private universities (SRC-104, SRC-106); the difference reflects inclusion criteria for newly established and specialized institutions rather than factual disagreement, and the proposal uses each count with its source. Total tertiary enrollment was 4,690,876 in 2020, the most recent year with a verified all-sector total: 4,362,187 in the public system including National University and Open University affiliated colleges, and 328,689 in private universities (SRC-05). The National University alone affiliates approximately 2,500 colleges serving around four million students (SRC-90), which makes it the numerically dominant but structurally weakest element of the system. Annual graduates across all sectors were 344,528 in 2021, the only verified national figure (SRC-06).

The government delivery system that would receive students is large and, by the government's own statistics, significantly understaffed. As of 30 June 2025, sanctioned posts in the civil administration stood at 1,986,272, of which 1,464,350 were filled, leaving 521,922 vacancies (26.3 percent) according to the Statistics of Government Employees 2025 reported in national press. Bangladesh Public Service Commission recommendations ranged between 1,457 and 2,805 candidates per BCS cycle between 2023 and 2026, and an estimated 40,000 employees retire annually (World Bank estimate; not an official figure). Administrative geography provides an extensive hosting network: 495 upazilas, approximately 4,554 to 4,585 unions, 330 pourashavas, 12 city corporations, 65,567 government primary schools, and 418 upazila health complexes (CSV 15-16). These figures matter because they define both the opportunity, real work in real offices, and the constraint: supervision, not office space, is the binding capacity limit identified in the Phase 3 research.

The financial context has hardened since the earlier research phases. Dhaka University's FY2025-26 budget of BDT 1,035.45 crore is financed 85.3 percent by a UGC grant of BDT 883.04 crore, with only BDT 90 crore from own income and a deficit of BDT 62.41 crore; its treasurer stated publicly that the university "does not have freedom in budget formulation" beyond the fixed UGC allocation (SRC-100). The public university system as a whole was allocated BDT 10,802.21 crore in the revised FY2025-26 budget, rising to BDT 12,300 crore for FY2026-27 (SRC-104, SRC-105). Private universities face the opposite stress: 116 institutions hold approximately 13.2 lakh seats but enroll only about 7 lakh students, a 53 percent occupancy rate, after the 2025 HSC examination produced the lowest pass count in 17 years (727,000 of 1.25 million candidates), and the sector depends "almost entirely on tuition fees for survival" (SRC-106). Any credible proposal must operate inside these constraints rather than assume them away.

3. Problem Statement

Four connected problems motivate this proposal. First, the university-government disconnection: most Bangladeshi graduates complete entire degree programs without structured exposure to how government offices actually function, even though government remains the largest formal employer of graduates and the largest producer of public records, statistics, and services. Existing degree-required placements are narrow and uneven: business programs require internships (the University of Dhaka BBA requires a three-credit internship within its 126-credit degree, SRC-109) and education degrees require 35 to 60 days of teaching practice (SRC-115), but arts, science, law, and engineering programs generally lack any structured public-sector exposure requirement. There is no national mechanism that connects the approximately 344,528 students who graduate each year (SRC-06) to the documented 521,922 vacant posts and chronic administrative backlogs in government offices.

Second, government offices face persistent capacity gaps in exactly the categories of work that university students can lawfully perform: digitizing and organizing non-confidential records, updating authorized databases, supporting education and health surveys, documenting service-delivery processes, and assisting public information services. These tasks accumulate because recruitment (1,457 to 2,805 BCS recommendations per cycle) cannot keep pace with vacancies and the approximately 40,000 annual retirements. Third, practical training quality is undermined by session delays ("session jam") and by internships that are often observational rather than substantive; a structured, supervised, credit-bearing service semester would give graduates verifiable work experience that labor-market research consistently identifies as valuable. Fourth, transparency and accountability in public services suffer from weak documentation and data quality; the international evidence base (Section 18) shows that information publication and audit mechanisms measurably reduce leakage, which suggests, but does not prove, that better-documented processes staffed by supervised students could strengthen integrity. The proposal treats this last hypothesis as a research question, not a promise.

The problem statement also includes an honest acknowledgment of what is not established. No Bangladesh dataset verifies how many government offices could host students, at what density, or with what supervision capacity; the Phase 3 research registered 12 data gaps on precisely these questions (CSV 26) and this phase adds 6 more (CSV 34). No international program of this type has demonstrated rigorous evidence of corruption reduction, and none is cited as proof. The problem this proposal solves is therefore modestly stated: connect verified student capacity to verified government work under a transparent, legally sound, university-financed arrangement, and measure what actually happens.

4. Objectives and Intended Public Benefits

The program pursues four primary objectives, each paired with the evidence status of its intended benefit. Objective 1, practical public-service capability: students complete real, authorized government work under supervision, producing verifiable work experience. Evidence status: strongly supported by domestic precedent; professional programs already treat supervised placement as essential training, and the design simply extends an accepted pedagogical instrument to a wider student population. Objective 2, measurable government work output: offices receive documented assistance with record digitization, data validation,

surveys, and citizen services. Evidence status: plausible but unquantified at national scale; the sector mapping (Section 11) identifies the work categories, and the pilot is designed to measure actual output per placement.

Objective 3, strengthened university-government cooperation: universities and receiving ministries establish standing placement relationships, joint supervision, and shared records. Evidence status: supported by program-design logic and international analogues (Indonesia's KKN institutionalized university-community linkage from 1971, SRC-111); the benefit is institutional and will be tracked through M&E; indicators U-1 to U-4. Objective 4, transparency and accountability improvements: better-documented processes, more accurate records, and independently monitored placements may strengthen integrity. Evidence status: conditional and explicitly unproven. The international literature (Reinikka and Svensson 2005 on Uganda's information campaigns reducing school-fund leakage from 80 to 20 percent; Ferraz and Finan 2008 on audit effects on electoral outcomes; Olken 2007 showing audits outperforming grassroots monitoring in some settings) establishes that transparency interventions can reduce specific leakages, but no study evaluates compulsory student service as an anti-corruption instrument. This proposal therefore commits to measuring integrity outcomes rather than claiming them.

The intended public benefits are correspondingly restrained: up to 130,000 graduates per year with supervised public-service experience once the program reaches its baseline-feasible ceiling; a documented annual work output whose value will be measured, not assumed, during the pilot; a national placement and records platform whose existence itself improves the transparency of university-government flows; and an evidence base on service-semester operations that Bangladesh currently lacks. The proposal deliberately does not promise savings from corruption reduction, improved BCS performance, or employment guarantees, because none of these can be supported by the evidence assembled in three research phases.

5. The Proposed Compulsory Service-Semester Model

The NUPSSP is defined by twelve design principles that operationalize the sponsoring policy's mandate. (1) Every student enrolled in an eligible degree program at a participating university must complete one full semester of direct service to government as a condition of graduation. (2) The service semester involves real, useful, authorized government work, not classroom learning about government, not a research assignment, not observation, and not an optional internship. (3) Students may apply for placements at any eligible point from the second year onward, subject to seat availability and qualification rules; the semester does not have to occur in the final year. (4) The government determines which public offices may accept students and how many seats exist. (5) The government allocates service-seat quotas to universities by a transparent formula (Section 9). (6) Universities coordinate participation, maintain academic records, and finance program costs. (7) Students continue paying their existing semester tuition and fees, and no new compulsory service fee may be created. (8) Students are not paid a salary or stipend in the baseline model; a university-administered, need-based support fund (UFM-08) assists low-income students with placement-related costs. (9) Successful completion is recorded on the transcript and verified before degree conferral. (10) Students exercise no powers reserved for public officials: no statutory authority, no independent decisions, no law-enforcement or regulatory functions, and no unauthorized access to confidential information. (11) All placements, applications, allocations, attendance records, completion decisions, and appeals are documented in a national

placement platform. (12) A student who has completed the requirement can never be assigned a second compulsory semester.

The model is deliberately conservative in its legal claims. Phase 3 legal research established that the National Service Ordinance 1970 is a dormant military instrument, male-only, never brought into operation by Gazette notification, and possibly repealed; it provides no authority for a civilian university program (CSV 18, LEG-01). A compulsory national requirement must therefore rest on new legislation, while voluntary pilots can proceed administratively through UGC coordination and university academic-council decisions. The phased roadmap (Section 20) sequences the program so that legal authority, funding rules, and operational capacity are each verified before the next phase unlocks.

Design in one sentence: one compulsory, government-placed, university-financed, university-recorded semester of supervised real work in a government office, available flexibly from the second year, verified before graduation, and never conferring official powers on students.

6. Definition of Eligible Universities and Degree Programs

Eligibility follows a phased institutional logic grounded in the affordability analysis (CSV 30). In Phase 1 (pilot), eligible institutions are 10 to 15 universities selected for academic readiness, geographic spread, and financial capacity: a mix of large public teaching universities and financially stable private universities. In Phase 2, eligibility extends to all public teaching universities (the approximately 49 to 53 direct-teaching institutions, excluding the National University and Bangladesh Open University) and private universities that meet financial-capacity entry criteria (proposed: at least 1,500 enrolled students or an audited operating surplus in two consecutive years, subject to GAP-33 verification). The National University's approximately 2,500 affiliated colleges and the Open University's 551,821 distance learners are excluded from compulsory scope in the baseline model: the structural finding (AFF-05, AFF-06) is that the university-funded rule cannot operate through fee-dependent micro-institutions and dispersed distance learners, and pretending otherwise would produce either unfunded mandates or forced closures. A voluntary opt-in pathway for capable NU colleges is defined for evaluation at the Phase 3 gate.

Eligible degree programs include all undergraduate and graduate programs of participating universities, with program-level rules. The verified program database (CSV 9) covers 40 faculties, 143 departments, and 24 named programs across six surveyed universities, and 167 of 173 universities remain to be surveyed at program level (GAP-16); eligibility rules are therefore structural rather than exhaustive. Four-year honours degrees form the core eligible population; five-year professional programs (engineering, law, agriculture, pharmacy) integrate the service semester in the fourth year by default; three-year pass programs, where they exist in direct universities, integrate at the second year; master's programs of one to two years integrate at the penultimate semester. Programs whose professional councils impose clinical, laboratory, or practice requirements (medicine, nursing, teaching) may count an approved public-service placement toward existing practicum requirements where the council's rules permit substitution, but no substitution is automatic: each program's academic council must map the equivalence explicitly, and where councils prohibit substitution

(for example BMDC clinical rotations), the service semester is scheduled around the professional requirement.

Institution type	Count (verified basis)	Compulsory scope	Rationale
Public teaching universities	49-53 (UGC FY2025-26 allocations list 57 incl. NU/BOU; SRC-104)	Phased: pilot selection, then all	Affordable at 0.3-0.6% of system budget with UGC budget-line authority (AFF-01)
Private universities (top/mid tier)	approx. 70 of 116 (enrollment >1,500; SRC-106)	Phased: capacity criteria, then qualifying institutions	1.6-3.4% of segment revenue; feasible for top tier, stressed for mid tier (AFF-02, AFF-03)
Private universities (lower tier)	approx. 46 (<1,500 enrolled)	Excluded from compulsory scope	8.2% of segment revenue; would force closures or illegal fees (AFF-04)
National University affiliated colleges	approx. 2,500 colleges, approx. 4M students (SRC-90)	Excluded in baseline; voluntary opt-in pathway	Cost equals approx. 64% of NU's entire UGC transfer; structurally infeasible (AFF-05)
Bangladesh Open University	551,821 learners (SRC-102)	Excluded; separate distance model if ever designed	Geographic dispersion incompatible with office-based semester (AFF-06)

Table. Eligibility by institution type

7. Definition of the Service Requirement

One full semester of service is defined as 16 to 18 calendar weeks of placement in a single government office, totaling 480 to 540 service hours at 30 hours per week, aligned with the participating university's semester calendar. The standard is deliberately anchored to the existing academic calendar rather than a separate national calendar, because universities operate on different schedules and a parallel calendar would multiply coordination costs; the national platform (Section 21) records semester windows per university and reconciles them with host-office availability. Students retain normal enrollment status during the service semester: they remain registered students of their universities, covered by university rules, student insurance (UFM-03), and existing fee arrangements. Full-time placement is the default; a part-time arrangement of no less than 20 hours per week across no more than 26 weeks is permitted only for students with documented disability, caregiving responsibilities, or employment obligations, approved case by case.

Attendance and completion standards follow professional-placement practice. Minimum attendance is 80 percent of scheduled service days, with justified absences (illness with medical certificate, bereavement, university examinations, emergencies) excused but requiring make-up days. Completion requires three verified elements: an attendance record countersigned monthly by the named host supervisor; a task register documenting the work performed against the published placement work plan; and a completion assessment jointly made by the host coordinator and the university coordinator, recorded as pass/fail with a written narrative. Academic credit is awarded at the university's discretion (typically 9 to 12 credits, matching one semester's load) but the graduation requirement is completion itself, not the credit: a student who fails the

service semester repeats the placement once; a second failure triggers the university's standard academic-consequence procedures and an appeal to the university's service-semester committee. Appeals are documented in the platform with reasons and outcomes.

The duration-neutral design principle deserves emphasis because session delay is a documented national problem (SRC-97 in Phase 3 research). The service semester replaces, not extends: its credits substitute for existing elective or practicum credits so that total program duration and time-to-degree are unchanged for students who complete the requirement on schedule. Each participating program's academic council must file a duration-neutrality certificate with UGC showing the credit substitution before its students become eligible; programs that cannot substitute without extending duration must schedule the service semester in a structural vacancy (for example, the eighth semester of five-year programs) or seek a program-specific exception. Time-to-degree is a core M&E indicator (ED-3), and any measured increase triggers a design review at the phase gates.

8. Student Eligibility and Flexible Timing

Eligibility to apply opens when a student has completed at least two semesters of the current degree and is in good academic standing, and closes when the student has two semesters remaining before expected graduation, so that every student has multiple application windows and no student is trapped by a single missed cycle. Within each university, placement rounds run twice per academic year (matching the two-semester calendar, ASM-05), with a national summer window operated where host offices can accept students. Priority in allocation is deliberately simple and published: (1) students in their final two semesters who have not yet completed the requirement receive first priority so the program does not delay graduation; (2) all other eligible applicants follow; (3) within equal priority classes, transparent selection among equally eligible applicants uses discipline match first, then a published random draw, never discretion. Repeat participation is prohibited: a student who has completed the requirement cannot be allocated again, and a student who withdrew from a placement for documented cause returns to the pool with priority preserved for one cycle.

Alternative arrangements exist for students who cannot complete a standard placement. Students with disabilities receive reasonable accommodations under a university-determined plan: accessible host offices, assistive technology (funded under UFM-07), adjusted hours, or part-time arrangements. Students whose professional-council requirements cannot be substituted (medical rotations, bar-required practice) complete an approved alternative public-service placement aligned to their professional constraints, for example non-clinical public-health administration for medical students. Students facing documented geographic hardship (no hosting office within reasonable commuting distance and no accommodation option) receive prioritized placement in the nearest available office with need-based support-fund assistance (UFM-08) or, where genuinely no placement exists, a supervised remote-eligible work category (records digitization with verifiable output tracking) during the pilot period, to be evaluated before Phase 2. Exchange students, transfer students, and students who change programs carry their completion status with them in the national platform; a student who transfers mid-degree without completing serves in the receiving university's next cycle.

The demand model (CSVs 12-13) quantifies why flexible timing matters. Annual graduates are not annual participants: students remain enrolled across several years, some withdraw, some repeat years, and session delay stretches cohorts. Modeling participants as the final-year cohort (130,178 in direct universities, PL-14) is the conservative steady-state estimate; flexible timing smooths the flow so that mid-degree students fill seats in low-demand semesters, reducing the waiting-list pressure that a final-year-only rule would create. The M&E framework tracks applications, allocations, waiting time, and completion by year-of-study (indicators P-1 to P-7) precisely so that this assumption is tested rather than assumed.

9. Government Seat Allocation to Universities

Seat allocation converts verified host capacity into university quotas. Host offices submit annual seat declarations describing the work, location, required skills, dates, and eligibility conditions; ministries consolidate and certify them; and the national allocation formula distributes seats across universities. The proposed formula weights four factors: eligible enrollment (50 percent), expected graduation demand, meaning final-two-semester students who have not completed the requirement (30 percent), and geographic accessibility, meaning the share of a university's students within commuting distance of declared host offices (20 percent). A minimum floor guarantees every participating university at least 25 seats per cycle while it has eligible demand, and a capacity ceiling prevents any university from receiving more seats than 110 percent of its verified applicant pool so that seats never idle while other universities have waiting lists.

Redistribution rules keep the system honest. Seats declined or unfilled by a university within 15 days of allocation return to the national pool and are redistributed to universities with waiting lists. Seats withdrawn by a host office before placement begins trigger priority reallocation for affected students in the next cycle. Students who withdraw after placement free their seats for the next eligible applicant in the same university. All allocations, declines, redistributions, and withdrawals are logged in the platform with reasons, forming an auditable allocation trail. The formula's illustrative operation (hypothetical, clearly labeled): a university with 20,000 enrolled, 4,000 in final two semesters, and 60 percent of students near host offices would score $20,000/\text{total} \times 0.50 + 4,000/\text{total} \times 0.30 + 0.60 \times 0.20$ of the national seat pool, subject to the floor and ceiling. Real allocation uses verified enrollment data from UGC annual returns and the platform's applicant registry, replacing the planning assumptions (ASM-08) as data accumulates.

The government's obligation is equally explicit: the allocation authority must never allocate more students than receiving offices have certified capacity to host effectively, because over-allocation converts a training program into exploitation and paperwork theater. Host certification requires each office to name a supervisor per placement cohort, describe the work plan, and confirm workspace, before its seat declaration is accepted. The supervision ratio follows the Phase 3 finding: one trained supervisor per 20 students as the planning default (1:10 for sensitive assignments, 1:30 only for batch-style digitization), and supervisor training capacity, not buildings, is the binding constraint on national scale (CSV 16).

10. Student Application and Placement Procedures

The placement cycle runs in seven documented steps. (1) Declaration: host offices submit seat declarations with work plans, supervisor names, skills required, and dates; ministries certify; the allocation authority publishes the national seat catalog. (2) Allocation: the formula allocates seats to universities; each university sees its quota and the catalog slice available to its students. (3) Publication: universities publish available placements to their eligible students with full work-plan detail; nothing about a placement is hidden before application. (4) Application: students apply through the platform, ranking up to five placements, with discipline-matching data drawn from their academic record. (5) Matching: the platform executes transparent matching, discipline match first, then student preference order, then random selection among equally eligible applicants, and produces ranked results with published rules. (6) Confirmation: matched students confirm within 10 days; unconfirmed seats flow to the next applicant; unmatched students remain in the pool with priority preserved for one cycle. (7) Record: every application, match, confirmation, decline, and appeal is a platform record with an audit trail.

Complaints and appeals follow a two-track procedure. Placement-process complaints (allocation errors, undisclosed conditions, discriminatory matching) go to the university's service-semester committee with a 15-working-day resolution requirement and escalation to the UGC program unit; conduct and safety complaints follow the safeguard route (Section 17) with independent review. A student cannot appeal a transparent random-draw outcome as such, but can appeal procedural defects, and all appeal outcomes are logged and published in aggregate. The procedures deliberately reject any model in which students choose arbitrary offices: every placement is bounded by qualification, safety, and discipline requirements declared by the host office, and the platform enforces them automatically.

11. National Government-Sector Mapping

Fourteen government sectors offer verified or reasonably estimated hosting capacity (CSV 15). The mapping distinguishes central ministries and divisions, subordinate departments and directorates, district and upazila administration, union-level offices, city corporations and municipalities, public hospitals and health facilities, government schools and education offices, agricultural extension, engineering and public works, social welfare agencies, public financial administration, statistics and planning organizations, environment and disaster management, land administration, and ICT and digital-government organizations. The proposal includes local-government bodies where their legal frameworks permit student placements and excludes public corporations and statutory authorities whose statutes impose employment restrictions; the exclusion list is a documented decision, revisable by the steering committee.

Sector	Illustrative host network	Illustrative authorized student work	Prohibited
Public administration	64 districts, 495 upazila complexes	Records organization and digitization (non-confidential), database updates, administrative summaries, citizen-service support	Statutory decisions, signatures, confidential records

Sector	Illustrative host network	Illustrative authorized student work	Prohibited
Education	65,567 primary schools, secondary schools, education offices	Education data collection and validation, literacy outreach, school surveys, resource management support	Teaching as substitute for employed teachers, student records without authorization
Health	418 upazila health complexes, district hospitals	Public-health campaigns, non-clinical patient-service administration, authorized health-data management, surveys	Clinical care, diagnosis, any BMDC-restricted duty
Local government	4,554-4,585 unions, 330 pourashavas, 12 city corporations	Union digital centre support, service documentation, local-data validation	Certificate issuance, approval decisions
Agriculture	Upazila agriculture offices, extension networks	Farmer surveys, extension program documentation, agricultural data collection	Pesticide certification, subsidy approval
ICT and digital government	a2i and digital-service offices	Software support, data validation, authorized digital-records work	Production-system access without authorization
Statistics and planning	BBS field offices	Survey enumeration support (authorized), data quality checks	Publication of statistics (official function)
Land administration	Land offices (upazila and district)	Records digitization (authorized scopes), process documentation	Mutation decisions, record corrections (statutory)
Environment and disaster	Department of Environment offices, disaster management units	Environmental data collection, preparedness documentation, awareness programs	Enforcement inspections
Social protection	Social services offices, program field units	Beneficiary-list validation support (authorized), program documentation	Beneficiary selection decisions
Engineering and works	Public works departments, LGED offices	Infrastructure documentation, project data collection, site surveys (authorized, supervised)	Structural sign-offs, safety certifications
Finance and accounts	Controller offices, audit-exempt administrative units	Non-confidential financial data analysis, documentation support	Payment approval, audit functions
Law and justice (administrative)	Law Ministry administrative units, legal-aid offices	Permitted legal research and documentation	Case decisions, court functions
Youth and sports	Youth development centers (DYD)	Program support, training-logistics assistance (DYD allowance precedent, SRC-56)	N/A (low-risk sector)

Table. Sector hosting map (verified networks, CSV 15-16)

Two boundaries govern the entire map. Students must never exercise powers reserved for public officials: no statutory authority, no regulatory or police powers, no financial approval, no confidential decision-making, and no independent public commitments. And every task must produce real, useful, documented work: a placement whose work plan consists of observation, errands, or unstructured help is invalid and fails host

certification. The sector map is illustrative but evidence-anchored; host-network sizes are verified (CSV 15), while hosting densities remain planning assumptions (ASM-11 to ASM-16) that the pilot is designed to replace with observed data.

12. University-Program-to-Service Matching

The matching matrix (CSV 14) connects 27 academic discipline clusters to sectors, host offices, suitable tasks, skill requirements, geographic options, and restrictions. Computer science and IT students support authorized digital systems, data validation, and platform assistance in ICT offices and union digital centres. Statistics and data-science students support surveys, data-quality improvement, and analysis in BBS field operations and sector offices. Economics students support economic analysis and development-program documentation in planning units. Law students support permitted legal research and documentation in legal-aid and administrative units, explicitly excluded from adjudicative functions. Public administration and political science students support administrative operations across district and upazila offices. Education students support education data collection, literacy outreach, and school surveys. Agriculture students support extension data collection and farmer information services. Engineering students support infrastructure documentation and technical data collection under supervision. Public-health students support non-clinical campaigns and health-data management. Business and accounting students support administrative and financial documentation in non-confidential scopes. Social-work, sociology, and development-studies students support authorized surveys and social-program administration. Environmental-science students support environmental data collection and preparedness documentation.

Where a discipline has no direct sector match, the matrix defines transferable-skill placements that still produce useful government work: humanities students in records digitization and citizen-service support; language students in public-information services and translation of citizen materials; fine-arts students in public-awareness campaign materials under commission. The matching rules also respect professional-council boundaries: BMDC-constrained clinical work is closed to non-medical students; engineering sign-off functions are closed to all students; teaching-practice substitution for education students follows the council's practicum rules. Each placement in the national catalog carries its discipline requirements from this matrix, and the platform's matching engine enforces them, which prevents both mismatched placements and the quiet assignment of students to irrelevant work.

13. Governance and Institutional Responsibilities

The governance model applies the minimum-bureaucracy test: every body proposed must perform a function no existing body can perform. The National Steering Committee, chaired by the Ministry of Education with the University Grants Commission as member-secretary and receiving ministries (Public Administration, Local Government, Health, Primary and Mass Education, Finance, ICT), the Ministry of Public Administration, and five vice-chancellors on rotation, owns policy, approves sector scope and the allocation formula, and reviews gate evidence. The UGC Program Unit, a dedicated office of 12 to 15 seconded staff (ASM-18 scaled), runs the national platform, executes allocation, certifies hosts, publishes statistics, and manages escalations. University service-semester coordinators (one per participating university, plus staff

proportional to participants) manage applications, academic integration, records, and student support. Host-office coordinators (one named officer per hosting office) manage work plans, supervision, attendance countersigning, and completion assessments. Students participate through published rules, grievance channels, and aggregate publication of complaints and outcomes.

Responsibility boundaries are explicit to prevent both gaps and overlaps. Seat allocation: steering committee sets the formula; the UGC unit executes it; universities receive, publish, and confirm. Finances: universities budget and spend within their own rules; UGC issues the budget-line circular for public universities (a spending-authority instrument, not new money, LEG-17); the steering committee reviews cost reports. Placement decisions: platform matching executes published rules; no ministerial or university office may override a match except through the documented appeal procedure. Student records: universities own academic records; the platform mirrors completion status for verification. Complaints: university committees first, UGC unit second, steering committee third for systemic issues. Audits: the program's annual audit, whether by the Comptroller and Auditor General's office within its mandate or an independent evaluator commissioned by the steering committee, is published. The model deliberately avoids a new statutory authority: UGC's existing coordination power under the UGC Order 1973 (s.5) and its grant-oversight role (s.5(3)) anchor the program unit administratively until the enabling law, if enacted, formalizes it.

14. University Funding Model and Financial Sustainability

The baseline funding rule is stated exactly as mandated: universities bear the costs of the program; students continue paying their existing semester and university fees under existing fee structures; no additional compulsory student fee is assumed; and government funding is not assumed in the baseline budget. The financial model (CSV 29) quantifies what this rule costs and tests whether universities can pay. Per participating student, the university cash cost is estimated at BDT 7,567 (low), BDT 12,050 (medium), and BDT 16,033 (high) per year, built from eight cost items: coordination and administration (BDT 1,000 to 2,000), orientation and role-specific training (BDT 2,000 to 5,000), group accident and medical insurance (BDT 500), the amortized national-platform share (BDT 1,667 to 3,333 at 300,000 scale), records and verification (BDT 200 to 500), monitoring and audit share (BDT 300 to 800), accessibility accommodations (BDT 100 to 300), and the need-based travel and living support fund covering approximately 30 percent of participants (BDT 1,800 to 3,600). Two cost classes sit deliberately outside the university cash line: daily transport and meals at the placement, borne by students exactly as they bear them in existing degree-required internships (estimated BDT 4,800 to 14,400 per placement, mitigated by near-campus placement priority and the need-based fund), and host-office workspace, utilities, and supervision time, contributed in kind by government and analyzed separately as supervision capacity.




Figure 1. Per-participant university cash cost breakdown, low / medium / high estimates (CSV 29, UFM-01 to UFM-09)

Scenario totals scale linearly: 100,000 participants cost BDT 75.7 to 160.3 crore per year; 200,000 participants BDT 151.3 to 320.7 crore; and 300,000 participants BDT 227.0 to 481.0 crore. One-time national setup (platform build, legal drafting, pilot design, institutional agreements) is estimated at BDT 200 to 500 crore, amortized within the platform share. The cost per completed placement, assuming 90 percent completion (ASM-27, anchored to the AmeriCorps 89 percent reference), is BDT 8,408 to 17,815. No savings from corruption reduction are counted anywhere in this model (ASM-22), and no stipend is budgeted (ASM-24): the research found no statutory wage obligation for degree-required placements (LEG-18), and the domestic precedents, the DU BBA internship, the B.Ed. teaching practice, and Indonesia's KKN, are unpaid. The need-based fund is a targeted equity instrument, not a stipend, and its scope is a published policy parameter.




Figure 2. Annual university cash cost by participation scenario (CSV 29, UFM-12 to UFM-14). The 200,000 and 300,000 scenarios exceed the baseline-feasible pool.

14.1 Can universities afford it? The evidence

For public universities the answer is conditionally yes at the aggregate level and only with a spending-authority change at the institutional level. The public system's revised FY2025-26 budget is BDT 10,802.21 crore for 57 universities (SRC-104); the public share of a 100,000-participant program is approximately BDT 30.3 to 64.1 crore, or 0.3 to 0.6 percent of the system budget (UFM-17). Dhaka University illustrates the institutional reality: with roughly 9,250 final-year students, its steady-state cost would be about BDT 11 crore per year, 1.1 percent of its budget; but DU is financed 85.3 percent by a fixed UGC grant, holds own income of only BDT 90 crore, runs a BDT 62.41 crore deficit, and its treasurer states the university cannot go beyond the allocated amount (SRC-100). Public universities therefore cannot absorb the cost through deficit spending or informal reallocation: the UGC budget-line circular (LEG-17), authorizing service-program expenditure heads within existing block grants, is the administrative prerequisite. This is spending authority, not new money, and it keeps the baseline rule intact: no new government appropriation is requested.




Figure 3. Steady-state annual program cost as a share of each segment's budget or revenue, medium estimate (CSV 30)

For private universities the answer divides by segment. The top tier (roughly 20 institutions with more than 5,000 enrolled students each) can absorb an estimated BDT 30 crore share, about 1.6 percent of estimated segment revenue (AFF-02). The mid tier (roughly 50 institutions) faces 3.4 percent of segment revenue, which is real money competing with campus investment but manageable for institutions with stable enrollment (AFF-03). The lower tier (roughly 46 institutions with fewer than 1,500 students) faces 8.2 percent of segment revenue, which is not affordable without fee pressure, and fee pressure is legally closed: the Private University Act 2010 framework requires fee structures compatible with the country's socio-economic condition, and since 2023 private universities require UGC approval before changing tuition fees fixed at admission (SRC-107, SRC-108), so costs cannot lawfully be passed to already-enrolled students as new charges. The proposal therefore excludes the lower tier from compulsory scope and defines financial-capacity entry criteria for the rest.

For the National University the answer under the baseline is no. NU spends BDT 795.55 per student per year (UGC 50th Annual Report, SRC-102); its students study in approximately 2,500 affiliated colleges that are separately financed, largely fee-dependent micro-institutions, many dependent on MPO salary support. Extending the university-funded rule to 169,822 NU-college participants would cost roughly BDT 205 crore per year against NU's entire UGC transfer of approximately BDT 318 crore, a 64.3 percent claim (AFF-05). This is the proposal's central structural finding: the 300,000-participant vision and the university-funded baseline are mutually exclusive, and the honest resolution is to scale the compulsory program to the direct-university ceiling of approximately 130,000 participants per year (PL-14, ASM-31) and to treat NU-college participation as a separate future decision that would require an explicit departure from the baseline funding rule, presented to Cabinet as such rather than smuggled in.




Figure 4. The baseline-feasible participant pool against the 300,000 target (CSV 12, PL-14 / PL-15)

14.2 If a university cannot pay

The baseline model includes four protection mechanisms rather than silent exceptions. First, entry criteria: no university is compelled to join before meeting financial-capacity thresholds, and phased sequencing (Section 20) keeps costs inside verified capacity. Second, deferral: a university hit by verified financial distress (audited deficit, enrollment collapse) may defer participation for its students by steering-committee decision, with students' graduation requirements suspended for the deferral period rather than unfairly enforced. Third, reallocation: universities with surplus own-income may voluntarily co-finance the need-based support fund of partner universities, an intra-university solidarity mechanism that keeps money inside the higher-education system rather than requesting government funds. Fourth, honest alternatives: Section 26.3 presents, clearly separated from the baseline and labeled as departures, three alternative funding models (a modest UGC augmentation for public universities, a government-funded platform as regulatory infrastructure, and a hybrid), with the evidence needed to choose among them. None of these alternatives is recommended as the baseline; they exist so that decision-makers see the full option space.

15. Legal and Regulatory Requirements

The legal review spans three research phases (CSVs 18 and 31, LEG-01 to LEG-20) and reaches five conclusions. First, new legislation is required for national compulsory scope: the National Service Ordinance 1970 is a dormant military instrument never brought into force and possibly repealed (LEG-01); no existing statute empowers the government to impose a uniform graduation requirement on all universities; and university autonomy over degree requirements rests with each university's statutory bodies under its own act. The enabling law must define the requirement, the funding rule, the fee prohibition, student status, safeguards, and the allocation mechanism. Second, voluntary pilots are legally possible now: universities may add service semesters through their academic councils and senates; UGC may coordinate and encourage under its statutory functions (UGC Order 1973, s.5), and its grant-withholding power (s.5(3)) gives it real but slow leverage (LEG-02). Third, the funding rule interacts with law in specific ways: public universities need

UGC budget-line authority to spend within fixed grants (LEG-17); private universities face the fee-lock provisions of the Private University Act 2010 framework as amended in 2023 (LEG-16), which conveniently hard-codes the no-new-fees rule; and private universities' non-profit trust structure (LEG-19) means costs come from operating margins. Fourth, students on degree-required placements are not workers under the general employment framework, so no statutory wage obligation exists, though a formal legal opinion (GAP-32) is required before the pilot to confirm injury-liability and insurance design (LEG-18). Fifth, data protection, confidentiality, workplace safety, disability accommodation, child protection where placements touch schools, and anti-corruption obligations each attach through existing instruments (Right to Information Act 2009 procedures, official-secrets obligations for hosts, and constitutional equality guarantees, Articles 27 and 28) and are operationalized in the program rules.

Requirement	Current authority	Status	Action needed
National compulsory graduation requirement	None (NSO 1970 dormant/military; university acts reserve degree requirements)	Gap	New enabling legislation (Cabinet + Parliament)
Voluntary university pilots	University acts (academic council / senate) + UGC coordination (s.5)	Available	UGC circular + university resolutions
Public-university spending authority	UGC grant framework; budgets within fixed allocation	Constrained	UGC budget-line circular (administrative)
Fee prohibition (no new service fee)	PU Act 2010 fee framework (private); UGC oversight	Partial (private) / Gap (public)	Statutory prohibition in enabling law; UGC audit
Student non-worker status / insurance	No statutory wage obligation found; insurance marketable	Likely; unconfirmed	Formal legal opinion (GAP-32); group policy procurement
Placement platform data handling	No comprehensive data-protection statute	Gap	Platform rules under enabling law; security audit
Confidentiality and access control	Official-secrets and service rules for hosts	Available for hosts	Placement agreements + role-based platform access

Table. Legal gap matrix (summary; full register CSVs 18 and 31)

The proposal flags what legal questions remain genuinely open and refuses to claim certainty where the evidence is incomplete: the precise section text of the Private University Act 2010 fee provisions (GAP-31), the interaction of service placements with professional-council rules beyond medicine and education, and the constitutional analysis of any future NU-college mandate all require qualified Bangladeshi legal counsel. The steering committee should commission a consolidated legal opinion as a Phase 0 deliverable, and the enabling-drafting process should be transparent about every point where this research says "unverified".

16. Academic Integration and Graduation Certification

Academic integration rests on three rules. Rule one, substitution: the service semester substitutes for existing elective or practicum credits so that program duration is unchanged; each program files a duration-neutrality certificate with UGC before its students become eligible (Section 7). Where a program already requires an internship, like the DU BBA's three-credit internship (SRC-109), an approved public-service placement may satisfy it where the academic council maps the equivalence explicitly; no equivalence is automatic. Rule two, recording: completion is recorded on the transcript as a distinct, verifiable entry (course code, host office, semester, pass/fail, narrative), and the degree checklist includes service completion alongside credit and CGPA requirements. Rule three, certification: the university may not confer the degree until the platform confirms completion or an officially authorized alternative; the confirmation is automated, so certification does not depend on paperwork chasing, and a university that graduates a non-completing student in error must record the correction publicly.

Session-delay mitigation is designed into the calendar. The two placement windows per year align with the two-semester calendar; a summer window exists where hosts can accept students; final-two-semester students hold allocation priority so the requirement never becomes a graduation bottleneck; and the guaranteed-placement rule commits the program to a simple principle: a university cannot require service without a confirmed placement, so if the system fails to place a student through no fault of their own, the requirement is deferred rather than the student punished. Time-to-degree (indicator ED-3) is tracked per program, and any measured increase beyond the pre-program baseline triggers a design review at the phase gate. These mechanics matter because Bangladesh's session-jam history (SRC-97) means any program that plausibly adds weeks to a degree will be resisted by students and families, correctly.

17. Student Rights, Safety, Accessibility, and Grievance Procedures

Students in the program remain enrolled students with full university protections, and the program adds placement-specific rights. Working conditions: standard office hours (no more than 40 hours per week, 30 hours of which count as service), no night work, no hazardous duties, and host-office compliance with applicable workplace-safety rules as if students were protected persons. Insurance: every participant is covered by a group personal-accident and medical policy procured by the university (BDT 500 per participant, UFM-03); Bangladesh's insurance market offers group personal-accident products with sum insured scalable from BDT 10,000 (SRC-113, SRC-114), and the procurement should specify coverage the steering committee deems adequate rather than the minimum. Safety screening: host offices and task plans are screened before certification; placements involving field visits require accompanied-travel rules; and placements in any setting involving minors (schools) require safeguarding checks aligned with education-service rules. Accessibility: students with disabilities receive accommodations under a university-determined plan, funded under UFM-07, with accessible host offices prioritized in allocation; participation rates of students with disabilities are an equity indicator (EQ-4).

Grievance procedures are two-tracked and time-bound. The conduct-and-safety track covers harassment, discrimination, unsafe conditions, and retaliation: complaints go to the university committee with a 10-working-day acknowledgment and 30-day resolution, with escalation to the UGC unit and an independent reviewer, and interim measures (placement suspension or reassignment) available immediately; complainants and witnesses are protected against retaliation by program rule and by the platform's audit trail. The process track covers allocation and matching disputes (Section 10). Aggregate grievance statistics (complaints received, resolved, upheld, time-to-resolution) are published annually, and any university or host office with a pattern of upheld complaints faces corrective action, including host de-certification. The program also guarantees information rights: students see the full work plan, conditions, and supervisor identity before confirming a placement, and may decline a matched placement once per cycle without losing priority.

18. Anti-Corruption Safeguards

The program's integrity logic is deliberately modest and measurable. The mechanisms through which the program could plausibly strengthen integrity are documentation and monitoring: better-documented service processes (task registers, process maps produced by students), more accurate public records (digitization and validation with dual-entry checks), identification of administrative bottlenecks (documented in placement reports), and independent eyes on service delivery (students as observers of process, never enforcers). The international evidence base supports the general proposition that information and audit mechanisms reduce specific leakages, Reinikka and Svensson's Uganda study found that publicizing school-capitation grants cut leakage from roughly 80 percent to under 20 percent; Ferraz and Finan showed audit revelations changed electoral outcomes in Brazil; Olken found official audits outperformed grassroots participation in reducing Indonesian road-project corruption, but that grassroots monitoring helped where free-riding was controlled. None of these studies evaluates compulsory student service, and this proposal does not claim they do: corruption-reduction is a hypothesis the M&E framework measures (indicators IN-1 to IN-5), not a benefit it promises.

The risk register is equally explicit about how the program could weaken integrity. Placement bribery (paying for desirable postings), seat-allocation manipulation, exploitation of students as unpaid substitute labor, assignment of unrelated or inappropriate work, pressure on students to falsify records or approve inaccurate reports, unauthorized access to sensitive information, retaliation against reporting students, conflicts of interest in host selection, misuse of student data, and discrimination are all registered (CSVs 20 and 32). The safeguard architecture answers each: transparent formula allocation with published logs (no discretionary seats); platform-recorded matching (overrides only through documented appeal); task registers with supervisor countersignature (no make-work or ghost placements); dual-entry data validation (no single-student falsification of records); role-based access with confidentiality agreements and audit logs (no unauthorized data access); anti-retaliation rules with independent review; annual published audits; and de-certification of hosts that violate standards. The absolute boundary stands: students receive no police powers, no regulatory powers, no financial approval authority, no confidential decision-making, and no enforcement role of any kind; a student who reports wrongdoing uses the grievance channel like any citizen, with program-added protection.

19. National Placement Capacity Calculations

Capacity is analyzed at three scenarios (CSVs 13 and 16). At 100,000 participants per year with two placement windows, 50,000 students are concurrently placed per window; the verified host network (495 upazila complexes, 4,554 unions, 330 pourashavas, 12 city corporations, 65,567 primary schools, 418 health complexes, plus district and central offices) can physically absorb this at hosting densities of 10 to 20 students per upazila-level institution (ASM-06, ASM-11 to ASM-16), and 5,000 to 10,000 trained supervisors are needed at the 1:10 to 1:20 ratios. At 200,000 participants, supervisor demand rises to 10,000 to 20,000 and the host network must operate near the upper planning densities; at 300,000, the constraint binds: 15,000 to 30,000 supervisors and near-full utilization of the planning-density ranges, which the Phase 3 research identifies as the binding constraint (supervision, not space). These are planning figures, and the pilot exists precisely to replace ASM-11 to ASM-16 with observed hosting densities and completion rates. The demand side is equally explicit: the baseline-feasible participant pool is approximately 130,178 final-year-equivalent students per year in direct universities (PL-14), so a 100,000-participant program is approximately 77 percent of the steady-state pool, leaving headroom for mid-degree participants, while 200,000 and 300,000 require National University college participation (PL-15) and are flagged as beyond the baseline.




Figure 5. Per-student annual expenditure spread across selected public universities, UGC 50th Annual Report 2023 (SRC-102): from BDT 5,23,536 (Bangladesh Maritime University) to BDT 795.55 (National University). The spread frames the affordability analysis and the NU structural finding.

Waiting times and completion are modeled conservatively. With two windows per year and priority rules for final-two-semester students, the target time from application to placement is within one cycle for priority students and within two cycles for others; waiting-list size is indicator P-6, and a waiting list exceeding 15 percent of applicants for two consecutive cycles triggers either seat expansion (within host certification) or intake throttling at the next university admission cycle, so the program slows itself rather than accumulating unfilled obligations. Completion is planned at 90 percent (ASM-27); non-completion triggers one repeat

placement, and chronic non-completion above 15 percent in any university or host triggers a quality review. The capacity model's honest limit is stated: no Bangladesh dataset verifies actual hosting willingness, so every capacity figure in this proposal is a planning assumption until the pilot reports.

20. Pilot and Phased National Implementation

The roadmap has four phases with evidence gates, and no phase opens until its gate passes (CSV 23 extended). Phase 0 (months 0-12), legal and institutional preparation: the enabling bill is drafted and introduced (national compulsory scope), the UGC budget-line circular is issued, the steering committee and program unit are constituted, the platform is procured and built (BDT 200 to 500 crore one-time within the consortium model), host-certification standards are published, and the consolidated legal opinion (GAP-32) is delivered. Gate 1 requires: legal authority for the pilot (voluntary university resolutions at minimum), the budget-line circular in force, the platform operational for allocation and records, and 10 to 15 universities with approved program designs and duration-neutrality certificates.

Phase 1 (months 12-30), the pilot: 10 to 15 universities (a deliberate mix of large public and financially strong private institutions across divisions), 5,000 to 10,000 students, two to four sectors per division with the sector mix weighted toward education, local government, health (non-clinical), and administration, and a full M&E; baseline. Gate 2 requires thresholds published in advance: at least 85 percent of placements certified as producing documented useful work; at least 80 percent completion (with 90 percent as the scale-up target); supervisor ratios verified at 1:20; average application-to-placement time within one cycle for priority students; no unremedied safeguard failure; time-to-degree not increased; and audited per-participant cost within the modeled range (BDT 7,567 to 16,033). Phase 2 (months 30-60), expansion: all public teaching universities and qualifying private universities toward 50,000 to 100,000 participants, with annual audit and gate review. Gate 3 is the national decision point: evidence on capacity, cost, and outcomes in hand, Cabinet decides on National University participation (which requires departing from the baseline funding rule), on the lower-tier private question, and on whether to legislate the full compulsory scope. Phase 3 (months 60-84) executes the Cabinet's decision, scaling to the chosen steady state, with the 130,000 ceiling as the baseline-consistent default.




Figure 6. Phased implementation timeline with evidence gates (CSV 23; phases as recommended in this proposal)

The roadmap's discipline is the proposal's answer to implementation risk: every expansion is conditional on published evidence, every gate has numeric thresholds agreed in advance, and the program is designed so that stopping at any gate is a legitimate outcome rather than a failure. This structure also respects the research protocol's instruction not to promise a nationwide launch date before feasibility is established: the timeline is conditional, and the national decision point is a decision, not a destination.

21. Digital Administration and Data Management

A single national platform is the program's operational backbone, and its scope is deliberately narrow: host and seat registry with certification status; allocation and matching with published rules and full audit logs; application and confirmation workflows; attendance countersigning; task registers; completion certification feeding university records; grievance intake and tracking (anonymized at aggregate publication); and the M&E; data pipeline. The platform is procured under fixed-price, staged-payment rules (RSK-23), reuses lawful existing government infrastructure where appropriate, and costs an estimated BDT 500 to 1,000 crore for build and initial operation (ASM-26), amortized per participant within the financial model (higher per-capita at entry scale, UFM-20). Universities integrate through documented interfaces with their own record systems rather than replacing them, and the platform's university-facing functions are designed so that a small coordinator office can operate them without dedicated IT staff.

Data management follows four rules. Minimum data: the platform collects only what allocation, placement, safeguarding, and M&E; require; no commercial use, no secondary use, no profiling. Role-based access: students, university coordinators, host coordinators, ministry viewers, and the program unit see only their scopes; confidential government records are never on the platform, and students never receive platform access to host-office internal systems. Security: independent security audit before Gate 1, annual re-audit, breach-notification obligations, and Bangladesh-origin data residency. Retention and transparency: placement records are retained for graduate-verification needs (degree-audit horizon), grievance records under published retention rules, and the platform's aggregate statistics (applications, allocations, completion,

complaints, costs) are published in open format annually, because a program justified partly on transparency cannot run on closed data. The absence of a comprehensive national data-protection statute (noted in the legal gap matrix) is handled by encoding these rules in the enabling law and platform procurement rather than waiting for external regulation.

22. Monitoring, Evaluation, and Accountability

The monitoring and evaluation framework (CSV 22, 19 indicators) covers six domains with named data sources and cadence. Participation (P-1 to P-7): eligible students, applications, placements, commencements, completions, waiting time, and time-to-placement, drawn from the platform automatically. Equity (EQ-1 to EQ-5): participation by university type and discipline, geographic distribution, accessibility for students with disabilities, and completion-rate gaps, published annually with disaggregation. Government performance (G-1 to G-4): verified task outputs (records digitized, surveys supported, processes documented), host-office satisfaction, administrative backlog measures, and data-quality indicators, collected through task registers and host reports with sample verification. Financial (F-1 to F-4): total expenditure, cost per placement and completion, cost by university and sector, and budget variance, from university financial reports consolidated by UGC. Integrity and safety (IN-1 to IN-5): complaints received, resolved, and upheld; incidents; audit findings; and confidentiality/safety compliance. Educational (ED-1 to ED-3): placement relevance to program of study, student satisfaction, and time-to-degree impact, from student exit surveys and university records.

Evaluation is designed to distinguish program effects from unrelated change. Baselines for backlog, data-quality, and time-to-degree measures are taken in Phase 0 before any placement begins; the pilot's 10-to-15-university design allows comparison across institutions and sectors; and an independent evaluator, commissioned by the steering committee and reporting publicly, conducts the Gate 2 and Gate 3 evaluations against the pre-registered thresholds. Corruption-related outcomes are measured through integrity indicators (complaints, audits, documented process improvements) and, where feasible, matched comparisons of offices hosting and not hosting students on documentation quality, but the framework never reports these as proven corruption reduction, consistent with the research protocol's prohibition. Accountability closes the loop: annual public reporting, published audits, parliament-facing reporting through the Ministry of Education, and gate decisions that are themselves documented with the evidence used.

23. Risk Analysis and Mitigation

Twenty-four risks are registered across six categories (CSVs 21 and 32), each with likelihood, impact, and mitigation. The highest-rated risks and their mitigations: education disruption and graduation delay (RSK-01, RSK-02) are answered by the substitute-not-add design, duration-neutrality certificates, two windows per year, and the guaranteed-placement rule. Public-university budget rigidity (RSK-17, new) is answered by the UGC budget-line circular and pilot-phase cost reporting. Private-sector distress (RSK-18, new) is answered by financial-capacity entry criteria and deferral pathways. Cost-shifting to students (RSK-19, new) is answered by statutory fee prohibition, fee-schedule audits, and grievance channels. NU two-tier equity criticism (RSK-20, new) is answered by publishing the structural finding and making NU inclusion an

explicit Cabinet decision rather than a quiet permanent exclusion. Placement quality collapse through underfunding (RSK-21, new) is answered by minimum placement standards, quality audits, and suspension powers. Exploitation as unpaid substitute labor, falsification pressure, placement bribery, unauthorized data access, and retaliation are answered by the safeguard architecture of Sections 17 and 18. Political risks (unfunded-mandate criticism, RSK-22) are answered by transparency about the affordability analysis; platform cost overrun (RSK-23) by fixed-price staged procurement; demand-side procrastination (RSK-24) by graduation-linked reminders and priority rules.

Risk	Category	Likelihood / Impact	Core mitigation
Session jam / graduation delay	Academic	High / High	Substitute-not-add credits; two windows; final-year priority; time-to-degree indicator with gate review
Exploitation as substitute labor	Integrity	Medium / High	Task registers; host certification; de-certification; student grievance channel
Public budget rigidity blocks payment	Financial	High / Medium	UGC budget-line circular; treat as spending authority, not new money
Private institutions fail under cost	Financial	Medium / High	Capacity entry criteria; deferral; phase private participation after public pilot
Hidden student fee-shifting	Financial / Equity	Medium / High	Statutory prohibition; UGC fee-schedule audit; complaint channel
Placement quality collapse	Quality	Medium / High	Minimum standards; independent quality audits; suspension of failing institutions
Two-tier equity criticism (NU excluded)	Equity	High / Medium	Publish structural finding; explicit Cabinet decision point at Gate 3
Platform overrun / failure	Operational	Medium / Medium	Fixed-price staged procurement; reuse lawful infrastructure; annual cost cap

Table. Top risks by severity (full register: CSVs 21 and 32)

Risk governance is continuous rather than a one-time exercise: the register is a living document owned by the steering committee, reviewed at every gate, and published with the annual report; new risks identified by the M&E; system or grievance channel enter the register with named owners; and mitigation failure at any gate is itself a stopping condition. The proposal's overall risk posture is deliberately reversible: because every phase is gated and every expansion is evidence-conditional, the worst-case outcome of a failed pilot is a documented negative result and a modest sunk cost (a fraction of the BDT 200 to 500 crore setup), not a national liability.

24. International Lessons

Six programs offer relevant lessons, drawn from the international comparison database (CSV 19) with the standing caution that no foreign system can be copied into Bangladesh's legal, financial, and administrative conditions without adaptation. Indonesia's *Kuliah Kerja Nyata* (KKN) is the closest analogue: institutionalized in 1971, compulsory for undergraduates, credit-bearing (approximately 8 SKS credits at leading universities, SRC-110), university-administered and university-financed, with no participant salary; it proves that a university-funded, credit-bearing, compulsory service requirement can operate at national scale for decades (SRC-111, SRC-112). Its lessons for Bangladesh: embed the program in university academic structures rather than a parallel bureaucracy; make the credit load explicit; and expect decades of institutional learning, not instant maturity. The Philippines' National Service Training Program (NSTP) shows a lighter-touch model (two semesters of modular civic-military-literacy training, three units each, under RA 9163) whose lesson is that program quality varies with supervision investment, its documented weakness. Nigeria's National Youth Service Corps (NYSC) proves scale (approaching 400,000 participants per year) but also carries the certificate-fraud warning documented in its history, the lesson that verification systems must be designed against forgery from day one, which is why the NUPSSP platform records completion with audit trails rather than paper certificates alone.

India's National Service Scheme (NSS) demonstrates volunteer-mass scale (3.65 million volunteers across 771 universities) but its lesson is a caution: volunteer-hour models produce thinner individual commitments than a supervised full-semester placement, and Bangladesh's objective, real work capacity, requires the denser format. AmeriCorps contributes the completion-economics reference (89 percent completion target used to anchor ASM-27) and a reminder that stipended programs carry per-participant costs an order of magnitude above the university-funded baseline. France's *Service National Universel* (84 voluntary hours) shows the voluntary-tier alternative but is not a compulsory graduation requirement. The synthesis: (1) university-financed compulsory service is internationally precedented (KKN) but always embedded in university governance, exactly as this proposal designs; (2) scale is achievable but takes decades and constant supervision investment; (3) verification must be engineered against fraud (NYSC); (4) none of the six programs, nor any program identified in three research phases, provides rigorous evidence that compulsory student service reduces corruption, which is why this proposal measures rather than claims that outcome.

25. Implementation Timeline

The timeline converts the phase structure into a month-by-month roadmap with named responsible institutions (Figure 6 summarizes). Months 0-3: Cabinet approval in principle; steering committee constituted (Ministry of Education); UGC program unit staffed; consolidated legal opinion commissioned; enabling bill drafting begins. Months 3-9: UGC budget-line circular issued; platform procurement under fixed-price staged rules; host-certification standards published with ministries; universities invited to apply for pilot selection with program designs and duration-neutrality certificates. Months 9-12: pilot universities selected (10-15); platform operational for registry, allocation, and application; supervisor training curriculum finalized; baseline M&E; data collection begins; Gate 1 assessment. Months 12-30: Phase 1 pilot operation, two full placement windows per year, mid-pilot review at month 21; Gate 2 evaluation by the independent

evaluator at months 27-30 against the pre-registered thresholds.

Months 30-60: Phase 2 expansion in three tranches (public teaching universities first, qualifying private universities second, additional sectors and geographic areas third), each tranche conditional on the previous tranche's published results; annual audits and public reports throughout. Months 60-66: Gate 3 national review: full evidence pack to Cabinet on capacity, cost, outcomes, the National University question, and the lower-tier private question. Months 66-84: Phase 3 execution of the Cabinet decision, scaling toward the chosen steady state with the 130,000 baseline-consistent ceiling as the default. Dependencies are explicit throughout: no pilot without Gate 1; no expansion without Gate 2; no national scaling without the enabling law in force and Gate 3; no phase proceeds without its published evidence. Responsible institutions are named per milestone in the implementation dataset (CSV 23), and the timeline is published in full so that slippage is visible rather than absorbed silently.

26. Budget and Financial Scenarios

The baseline financial presentation, required to be prominent, is stated in five sentences. Universities bear the costs of implementing the program. Students continue paying their existing university fees under the existing fee structure. No additional compulsory student fee is assumed. Government funding is not assumed in the baseline budget. Any alternative funding model is presented separately below and clearly labeled as a departure. Under this baseline, the national program costs BDT 75.7 to 160.3 crore per year at 100,000 participants (the recommended steady-state entry scale), BDT 151.3 to 320.7 crore at 200,000, and BDT 227.0 to 481.0 crore at 300,000, with one-time setup of BDT 200 to 500 crore and per-participant university cash costs of BDT 7,567 to 16,033 (Figure 2). Public and private costs are shown separately: at 100,000 participants, public universities carry approximately BDT 30.3 to 64.1 crore (0.3 to 0.6 percent of the system budget) and private universities approximately BDT 45.4 to 96.2 crore (0.7 to 3.1 percent of estimated sector revenue). The affordability differences between the sectors are structural: public universities are grant-financed with fixed allocations and need spending-authority reform, while private universities are tuition-financed with market-driven stress concentrated in the lower tier, which the design excludes from compulsory scope.

26.2 Cost traceability and what is not counted

Every figure in this section traces to the financial model (CSV 29), whose every unit cost carries its basis, year of prices, and uncertainty range; the underlying evidence rows are registered (CSV 28), and the assumptions register (CSVs 24 and 35) records sensitivity notes. Three classes of value are deliberately not counted as program costs or benefits: student-borne placement living costs (disclosed at BDT 4,800 to 14,400 per placement, not a fee, mitigated by near-campus priority and the need-based fund); host-office in-kind contributions (workspace and supervision time, analyzed as capacity, not monetized as cash); and any savings from corruption reduction or administrative efficiency (counted as zero everywhere, per ASM-22). This conservatism means the budget presents the program's cost honestly, and any future evidence of benefits would be upside, not baked-in justification.

26.3 Alternatives, clearly separated from the baseline

Three alternatives exist if the baseline proves too tight at any gate, and none is silently substituted. Alternative A, targeted UGC augmentation: a dedicated service-program line within UGC's university allocations (on the pattern of the unified research-grant channel, SRC-123) that reimburses public universities' service-program expenditure above a threshold; this is government money by another route, departs from the baseline, and would require the enabling law to authorize. Alternative B, government-funded platform as regulatory infrastructure: the placement platform funded as e-government infrastructure (on existing e-governance cost patterns) while universities retain all per-participant costs; this narrows the departure to the platform and lowers per-capita cost at entry scale (UFM-20). Alternative C, phased hybrid: baseline for the pilot and Phase 2, with Alternative A triggered only if Gate 2 shows public-university reallocation failing in practice. Each alternative carries its own integrity risks (funding-dependency, mission capture) and each would require Cabinet decision, legislative authority where needed, and public disclosure as a departure from the sponsoring policy's funding rule.

27. Expected Outcomes and Limitations

What the program can credibly deliver, assuming the gates pass: up to approximately 130,000 graduates per year with supervised, verified public-service experience once at steady state under the baseline; a measured annual volume of documented government work (records digitized, surveys supported, processes documented) whose pilot-measured value will be published; a standing university-government placement infrastructure (platform, certified hosts, trained supervisors, coordinators) that outlives any cohort; stronger university-government institutional relationships; and a national evidence base on service-semester operations that currently does not exist. What the program may deliver if the integrity hypothesis holds: improved documentation quality, better data accuracy, and identified process bottlenecks in hosting offices, measured against Phase 0 baselines. What the program will not promise: proven corruption reduction (no supporting evidence exists anywhere in the international record assembled across three research phases); BCS performance improvements; employment guarantees; or fiscal savings. These are measured questions, not benefits.

The limitations are stated with the same directness. The demand, capacity, and cost models rest on planning assumptions (ASM-01 to ASM-32) that the pilot must replace with observed data; the university-finance evidence base is deep for Dhaka University and the system aggregate but thin institution-by-institution (GAP-30, GAP-33); the legal analysis flags points requiring formal counsel (GAP-31, GAP-32); the program's baseline scale ceiling of approximately 130,000 participants means roughly 215,000 of the nation's 344,528 annual graduates (mostly NU-college students) remain outside compulsory scope under the funding rule as mandated; and the 2025 HSC pass collapse means the private university sector enters this program financially weakened, which the phase design respects by sequencing private participation after the public pilot. None of these limitations is fatal; all of them are the reason the roadmap is gated, measured, and reversible.

28. Recommendations and Decisions Requested

The government is asked to take ten decisions. (1) Approve the NUPSSP design and the phased roadmap in principle, with the 130,000-participant baseline-consistent ceiling as the planning default. (2) Direct the Ministry of Law and the Ministry of Education to draft the enabling law covering the compulsory requirement, the funding rule, the statutory prohibition on new service-linked student fees, student status and safeguards, the allocation mechanism, and data rules. (3) Direct UGC to issue the budget-line circular authorizing service-program expenditure heads within existing public-university block grants, as spending authority rather than new appropriation. (4) Approve the Phase 0 workplan: steering committee, program unit, platform procurement under fixed-price staged rules, host-certification standards, and the consolidated legal opinion. (5) Approve the Phase 1 pilot with 10 to 15 universities and 5,000 to 10,000 students, with the pre-registered Gate 2 thresholds. (6) Adopt the financial presentation rule: baseline figures only in the main budget narrative; any alternative funding model requires an explicit, labeled Cabinet decision. (7) Decide, at Gate 3 and not before, the National University question, with the full structural-finding evidence on the table. (8) Decide, at Gate 3, the lower-tier private-university question on the affordability evidence. (9) Commission the independent evaluator and publish the evaluation thresholds, the audit reports, and the annual open-data statistics from Gate 1 onward. (10) Protect the research protocol: require that no program communication claim corruption reduction, employment effects, or savings that the M&E; evidence does not support.

Pre-implementation verification list (conditions the research registers as open): university-level financial statements (GAP-30); Private University Act 2010 full-text fee provisions and the 2023 amendment gazette (GAP-31); the formal legal opinion on student placement labor status and liability (GAP-32); private-university sector financial returns for entry criteria (GAP-33); insurance market quotations for group cover (GAP-35); and enrollment-by-year-of-study data to replace the uniform-cohort assumption (GAP-19). Each gap names its holding institution and a recommended RTI request in the data-gap registers (CSVs 08, 26, and 34), so the verification program can begin immediately upon approval.

29. Supporting Datasets, Assumptions, and Source References

This proposal is backed by a complete evidence package (deliverables A to L of the research protocol), delivered as 36 CSV datasets, a consolidated Excel workbook, and this document. A, national higher-education database: 173 universities with category, establishment, location, and recognition status (CSV 1). B, academic program database: 40 faculties, 143 departments, and 24 programs verified across six universities, with a coverage register for the remaining 167 (CSVs 9 and 9b; GAP-16). C, government organization database: 148 organizations including 43 verified top-level bodies (CSV 4). D, workforce and capacity dataset: sanctioned, filled, and vacant posts (CSV 5b), recruitment (CSV 5), retirement (CSVs 6 and 6b), and hosting-capacity model (CSV 16). E, program-to-service matching matrix: 27 discipline clusters (CSV 14). F, student demand model: the 20-stage participation pipeline and three scenarios (CSVs 12 and 13). G, university financial feasibility model: the university-funded baseline, per-participant costs, scenario totals, and affordability verdicts (CSVs 28, 29, and 30). H, legal and regulatory gap analysis: 20 instruments across two registers (CSVs 18 and 31). I, operational and risk register: 24 risks with mitigations (CSVs 21

and 32). J, international comparison: six program profiles (CSV 19). K, data-gap register: 35 gaps with RTI pathways (CSVs 08, 26, and 34). L, source register: 123 sources with URLs, publishers, dates, and quality flags (CSVs 07, 25, and 33).

Every major statistic in this document carries a traceable identifier (SRC, PL, UFE, UFM, AFF, LEG, RSK, ASM, or GAP), every dataset documents its reporting period, definitions, coverage, and limitations, and missing values are recorded as NA rather than imputed. The assumptions register (32 assumptions across two phases, CSVs 24 and 35) records the sensitivity of each planning parameter, and the data dictionary files (CSVs 11, 27, and 36) define every column. The research protocol's evidence standards were applied throughout: official sources prioritized, both English and Bangla press consulted, search snippets never treated as sufficient for policy conclusions, historical data kept separate from current estimates, and every figure labeled as reported, calculated, estimated, or hypothetical. The complete package accompanies this proposal so that reviewers can audit any number, test any assumption, and reproduce every calculation without trusting this document's narrative.