

National University Public Service Semester Programme

One supervised, credit-bearing semester of public service in every undergraduate degree — required for graduation, financed by universities within existing fee structures.

Submitted for review by the Ministry of Education, the University Grants Commission of Bangladesh and partner ministries. Grounded in a four-phase research programme: 123 registered sources, 36 datasets, 35 documented data gaps and 32 registered assumptions. Companion technical annexes: the 32-page master policy proposal and the 42-sheet research database.

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Letter of Transmittal

The Secretary, Ministry of Education, Government of Bangladesh.

The Chairman, University Grants Commission of Bangladesh.

Cabinet Division, Ministry of Public Administration, and Ministry of Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs
(for attention).

Subject: Formal Proposal for the Establishment of the National University Public Service Semester Programme (NUPSSP).

Respected Sir/Madam,

On behalf of Gulshan Sync Solution, I have the honour to submit the enclosed formal proposal for the National University Public Service Semester Programme. The proposal recommends that every undergraduate degree in Bangladesh incorporate one supervised, credit-bearing semester of public service as a graduation requirement, financed by universities within their existing fee structures and without any new government appropriation or any new compulsory student fee. The programme is designed to strengthen the delivery capacity of public offices while giving graduates structured, disciplined exposure to the public service they will one day lead.

This proposal rests on a completed four-phase research programme comprising 123 registered sources, 36 documented datasets, 35 registered data gaps with Right to Information pathways, and 32 registered planning assumptions with sensitivity notes. Every figure presented herein carries a traceable identifier, and missing values are recorded as gaps rather than imputed. The comprehensive technical annexes — the 32-page master policy proposal, the 42-sheet research database, and the full dataset series — accompany this submission and are listed in Annex B.

We respectfully request the opportunity to present this proposal before the relevant working group and to respond to questions of fact, method and design. We remain, Sir/Madam, your most obedient servant.

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Dated: October 2026

Executive Summary

Bangladesh operates one of the largest higher-education systems in the world and one of the most capacity-constrained civil services. As of 30 June 2025, 521,922 of 1,986,272 sanctioned government posts stood vacant, equal to 26.3 percent of the establishment, while Bangladesh Public Service Commission recommendations in recent cycles have ranged only between 1,457 and 2,805 posts against roughly 40,000 retirements every year. At the same time, 4,690,876 tertiary students are enrolled across the system and 344,528 graduate annually. This proposal connects these two facts through a single structural instrument: a

supervised, credit-bearing public-service semester embedded inside every undergraduate degree.

The programme is deliberately conservative in its claims and its funding rule. It is financed by universities within existing fee structures — no new government appropriation, no new compulsory student fee — and it claims no corruption-reduction savings anywhere; integrity outcomes are designed as measured indicators, never promised results. Under this university-funded baseline, the verified direct-university final-year pool is 130,178 students per year (52,651 in public direct universities and 77,527 in private universities). The frequently discussed 300,000-participant target exceeds this pool by 169,822 and would structurally require National University affiliated-college participation, which the baseline cannot carry; this proposal therefore recommends phasing to approximately 130,000 participants per year and treating 300,000 as a conditional later question.

The proposal at a glance. Baseline-feasible scale: **130,178 participants per year**. University cash cost per participant: **BDT 7,567 / 12,050 / 16,033** (low / medium / high). Annual cost at 100,000 participants: **BDT 75.7–160.3 crore**, of which the public share is 0.28–0.59 percent of the Tk 10,802 crore public university system budget. Implementation: **five phases with four independent decision gates**; no expansion proceeds without published evaluation evidence. No new government appropriation; no new compulsory student fee; no claimed corruption savings.

The proposal proceeds in thirteen sections. Sections 1–3 establish the rationale, the programme design and the participation mathematics. Sections 4–5 set out the financing model and the segment-by-segment affordability analysis. Sections 6–9 address the legal pathway, the integrity architecture, supervision capacity and the international evidence. Sections 10–13 present phased implementation, monitoring and evaluation, risk management, and the requested decisions. Two annexes summarise the verified data base and the evidence standards that govern every number in this document.

1. Background and Rationale

The immediate context of this proposal is a persistent gap between the establishment strength of the Government of Bangladesh and its operational strength in the field. The official Statistics of Government Employees records 1,986,272 sanctioned posts and 1,464,350 filled posts as of 30 June 2025, leaving 521,922 posts vacant, equal to 26.3 percent of the establishment. Recruitment arithmetic does not close this gap: the 43rd to 47th Bangladesh Civil Service cycles produced between 1,457 and 2,805 recommendations each between 2023 and 2026, while the World Bank has estimated annual government retirements at roughly 40,000. Even an unusually strong recruitment year replaces only a fraction of the outflow, and the constraint is felt most acutely at the service-delivery front line where records are kept on paper and citizens queue for basic documents.

Four structural frictions compound the staffing gap. First, published citizen charters diverge from practice: waiting times, required steps and informal demands at service points routinely exceed the published standards, and citizens lack structured feedback channels to register the difference. Second, administrative delays create opportunities for speed-money demands at identified bottlenecks — every unnecessary queue

is an informal toll booth. Third, incomplete and outdated paper registers leave space for ghost entries and manipulation; where records cannot be queried, they cannot be audited. Fourth, information asymmetry forces citizens to depend on brokers for procedures that are, in principle, public and free. None of these frictions is primarily a money problem; each is a capacity, records-discipline and information problem.

Against this stands an underused national asset. The university system enrolled 4,690,876 students in 2020 (the most recent year with a verified all-sector total) and graduates 344,528 students annually (2021, the only verified national graduate figure) across 173 universities. These graduates are literate, disciplined, increasingly numerate and digitally fluent — and under current arrangements, not one of them is required to set foot inside a government office before entering the job market. The Constitution itself supplies the values anchor: Article 21 declares it the duty of every citizen to observe the Constitution and the laws, to maintain discipline, to perform public duties and to protect public property. A service semester is a practical, structured and time-bounded expression of that duty.

The proposal's premise in one sentence: **the binding gap in public delivery is not only budget — it is working capacity, records discipline and citizen information — and the university system already produces hundreds of thousands of trained minds a year who never touch a public office before graduating.**

2. The Proposed Programme

The National University Public Service Semester Programme (NUPSSP) embeds one compulsory, credit-bearing, supervised public-service semester inside every undergraduate degree. Students are placed in government offices and public institutions matched to their field of study, work under a trained supervisor at a ratio not exceeding one supervisor per twenty students, complete defined task portfolios with documentary outputs, and receive academic credit on verified completion. The semester substitutes existing internship, attachment or project credits wherever a programme already requires them, so that no student's time-to-degree is extended. This substitution rule is a design constant, not an option: Bangladeshi public universities already suffer multi-year session delays, and any model that appends time to the degree would compound a known national problem.

2.1 Design principles

Six principles govern every element of the design. (i) **In-degree, not appended**: the semester substitutes existing credits and is graduation-delay neutral by construction, verified against matched non-participant cohorts. (ii) **Discipline-matched placement**: assignments follow the student's field of study across fourteen verified host sectors, so that a computer-science student digitises records while a law student supports legal-aid reception — each contributes what they already know. (iii) **Supervised**: every placement has a named trained supervisor and a host-office focal point; unsupervised placement is a nullity under this design. (iv) **Bounded role**: students support and document; they never exercise statutory power, never evaluate procurement and never access personal or confidential records. (v) **University-financed**: costs are carried by universities within existing fee structures under the baseline funding rule. (vi) **Transparent by design**:

digital attendance, task logs and published aggregate statistics make the programme itself auditable from day one.

2.2 What students do — discipline-matched assignments

The research programme mapped twenty-seven discipline clusters to fourteen host sectors with verified institutional counts. The table below illustrates six representative mappings; the complete mapping, with permitted role limits and special arrangements for each cluster, is maintained in the research database (dataset 14). Assignments are deliberately structured toward tasks that are useful when done by supervised novices — recording, digitising, organising, assisting, verifying — rather than tasks requiring professional judgement or legal authority.

Discipline cluster	Sample assignments	Host sector and verified network
Computer Science and Engineering	Records digitization on approved project lists; portal content organization; data-entry quality assurance	Digital government (ICT Division, a2i)
Law	Legal-aid clinic reception and form assistance; RTI awareness sessions; supervised research	Public information and justice-adjacent support
Statistics	BBS-authorized survey enumeration; aggregate data-quality checks	Research, statistics and data quality
Medicine and Public Health	Immunization campaign recording; clinic queue management; health-education sessions	Healthcare (418 upazila health complexes; 64 district hospitals)
Business and Accounting	Bid document organization (never evaluation); asset-register digitization	Procurement documentation cells (CPTU standard operating procedure)
Education	After-school tutoring; attendance register digitization; library organization	Education (65,567 government primary schools)

Table. Representative discipline-to-assignment mappings (from 27 mapped clusters and 14 host sectors)

2.3 What students never do — hard role limits

The integrity of the programme depends as much on its prohibitions as on its assignments. Five limits are absolute and are written into every placement memorandum of understanding. First, students hold no statutory or inspection powers of any kind; they have no Anti-Corruption Commission powers, no enforcement role and no authority over any citizen or officer. Second, students never handle confidential or personal records; they work on aggregate and de-identified tasks under a data-access MOU for each placement. Third, students take no part in procurement evaluation — bid security and evaluation materials are off-limits, and their procurement role is confined to documentation organisation. Fourth, students never confront staff; findings flow through supervisors and the programme monitoring unit, never through public accusation. Fifth, students never replace government employees: the 521,922 vacant posts are unfilled jobs, not hosting capacity, and the programme is a support layer, not a staffing substitute. Where a student

incidentally observes apparent misconduct, the programme provides a confidential referral form routed to a designated protection officer, who may refer the matter to the department head, the ACC public complaint channel, or the whistleblower framework of the Public Interest Information (Protection) Act, 2011. Students are never tasked to find misconduct.

The integrity contribution comes from structured presence and documentation — not from investigative powers. Students observe against published charters with pre-approved instruments, record with timestamps from official registers, and refer through authorised channels. The programme's honesty rule: integrity outcomes are measured (indicators GOV-01 and GOV-02), never promised.

3. Participation, Scope and the 300,000 Question

Any credible proposal must state plainly who can participate and at what scale. The verified participation pipeline is built from actual counts, not aspirations. Total tertiary enrolment stood at 4,690,876 in 2020 (4,362,187 in the public university system including National University and Bangladesh Open University affiliates, plus 328,689 in private universities). The National University alone oversees roughly 2,500 affiliated colleges serving about four million students. Annual graduates number 344,528 (2021). Applying a uniform-cohort assumption across a four-year honours degree, the estimated national final-year cohort is approximately 1,172,719 students; the directly eligible pool under a final-year model — public direct-teaching universities plus private universities — is 130,178 students per year (52,651 public direct, derived from a 2015 enrolment base, and 77,527 private, derived from the 2021 base of 310,107 enrolled students). The mixed data vintage of these bases is registered, and the figure is treated throughout as an order-of-magnitude estimate refinable through the Right to Information pathway.

Against this pool, three planning scenarios were modelled. A programme of 100,000 participants per year equals 8.5 percent of the national final-year cohort and is feasible within direct universities with partial headroom. A programme of 200,000 already requires National University college participation. The frequently discussed 300,000-participant scale equals 25.6 percent of the national final-year cohort (6.4 percent of total enrolment) and exceeds the direct-university pool by 169,822 students — a structural shortfall, not a recruitment gap. A 300,000 programme cannot be filled from public direct and private universities alone; it structurally requires National University affiliated-college participation, and the affordability analysis in Section 5 shows the university-funded baseline cannot carry NU colleges: the cost would equal approximately 64.3 percent of the National University's entire UGC grant.




Figure 1. The participation pool gap: direct-university final-year pool (130,178) against the 100,000 / 200,000 / 300,000 scenarios. The 300,000 scenario exceeds the pool by 169,822 (finding PL-15).

The proposal therefore adopts the following position on scale. The programme phases to a ceiling of approximately 130,000 participants per year — the verified direct-university pool — under the university-funded baseline. National University colleges enter later, voluntarily, and only under a separately financed model; Bangladesh Open University distance learners are excluded from the baseline scope because a service semester presupposes geographic placement. The 300,000 figure is treated as a conditional Phase-4 question to be decided on evidence, not a starting commitment. This is a deliberately unheroic recommendation; it is also the only one the verified numbers support.

4. Financing Under the University-Funded Baseline

The funding rule is the defining constraint of this proposal and is stated here exactly as it governs every cost line: universities finance the programme within existing fee structures; there is no new government appropriation; there is no new compulsory student fee; and students pay exactly what they pay today. The rule has two legal teeth. For private universities, the Private Universities Act 2010 and the 2023 UGC fee-approval regime lock fee levels, making any fee-funded expansion legally impossible and the no-new-fees rule self-enforcing. For public universities, spending within existing grants requires a UGC budget-line circular — an exercise of spending authority over money already appropriated, not new money. Within this rule, the model prices eight cost lines per participant, all borne by universities or a university consortium.

Cost line	Low	Medium	High	Basis
University coordination and administration	1,000	1,500	2,000	One coordinator per 200 participants (ASM-18)
Student orientation and role-specific training	2,000	3,500	5,000	3-5 day induction; content, venue, materials
Group accident and medical insurance	500	500	500	Personal-accident products from Tk 10,000 sum insured
National placement platform (amortized)	1,667	2,500	3,333	BDT 500M-1,000M build-and-run over 300,000 participants
Records, verification and certification	200	350	500	Transcript integration and verification workflow
Monitoring, evaluation and independent audit	300	500	800	Independent M&E; institution and spot audits
Accessibility accommodations	100	200	300	Disability accommodations; CRPD principles (Art. 27-28 context)
Need-based travel and living support fund	1,800	3,000	3,600	30% of participants, 4 months, Tk 1,500/2,500/3,000
Total per participating student	7,567	12,050	16,033	Sum of cost lines (UFM-09)

Table. Per-participant university cash cost model (BDT, low / medium / high)

Two features of this cost structure deserve emphasis. First, there is no universal stipend. No statutory wage obligation was identified for degree-required academic-credit placements, and the domestic precedents — the University of Dhaka BBA internship, B.Ed. practice teaching, and Indonesia’s KKN service scheme — are unpaid. Equity is addressed instead through a targeted need-based fund covering approximately thirty percent of participants (away-from-home placements prioritised), which is a support measure, not a wage. Second, the largest cost lines are training and coordination, not bricks: the programme’s binding resource is people and process, which is why the supervision analysis in Section 8 matters more to feasibility than any line in this table. A one-time national setup investment of BDT 20–50 crore (platform build, legal drafting, pilot design, institutional agreements) is amortised within the platform line, and student-borne daily transport and meal costs at placement are disclosed openly (BDT 4,800–14,400 over four months at prevailing rates) and mitigated through near-campus placement priority and the need-based fund.

At scale, the annual university cash cost is BDT 75.67–160.33 crore at 100,000 participants; BDT 151.33–320.67 crore at 200,000; and BDT 227.0–481.0 crore at 300,000 — the last being not achievable under the baseline for the structural reasons given in Section 3. The public-university share at 100,000 participants is BDT 30.3–64.1 crore, which is 0.28–0.59 percent of the Tk 10,802.21 crore public university system budget; the private-university share is BDT 45.4–96.2 crore, or 0.7–3.1 percent of estimated sector tuition revenue. Cost per completed placement, at a 90 percent completion assumption benchmarked to AmeriCorps’ 89 percent, is BDT 8,408–17,815. What is deliberately absent from this model is equally important: no government cash funding appears anywhere (excluded by rule), and no corruption-reduction savings are counted as a benefit anywhere (excluded by methodological discipline, because no such saving

has been demonstrated for any programme of this type anywhere in the world).




Figure 2. Composition of the per-participant cost stack at low, medium and high estimates (BDT). Training and coordination dominate; there is no stipend line.

5. Segment Affordability and Recommended Scope

Aggregate affordability is meaningless in a sector as heterogeneous as Bangladeshi higher education; the analysis therefore proceeds segment by segment, using verified system finance data — the Tk 10,802.21 crore revised public university system budget for FY 2025-26, per-student spending spreads from the UGC’s 50th annual report, and private-sector revenue estimates calibrated against the sector’s 53 percent seat occupancy and the seventeen-year-low 2025 HSC pass cohort. The verdicts below are the load-bearing findings of the entire financing analysis.

Segment	Participants	Cost share of segment resources	Verdict
Public direct universities (49-53 teaching universities)	40,000	0.28-0.59% of the Tk 10,802 crore system budget	Conditionally feasible - requires UGC budget-line circular (spending authority, not new money)
Private top tier (approx. 20 institutions, over 5,000 enrolled each)	25,000	1.6% of estimated segment revenue	Feasible - absorbable within operating margins
Private mid tier (approx. 50 institutions)	30,000	3.4% of estimated segment revenue	Stressed - phased entry criteria recommended
Private lower tier (approx. 46 institutions, under 1,500 enrolled)	13,500	8.2% of estimated segment revenue	Not feasible - exclusion or deferral recommended
National University affiliated colleges (approx. 2,500 colleges)	169,822 needed for 300,000	64.3% of NU's entire UGC transfer	Structurally infeasible under the baseline - voluntary opt-in later, under a separate model
Bangladesh Open University (distance)	Excluded	-	Distance learners geographically dispersed; a separate distance-service model would be required

Table. Affordability by segment (steady state, medium cost estimate)

Three consequences follow. First, public-university participation is a budget-classification exercise, not a budget exercise: the money exists within goods-and-services lines, and what is required is a UGC circular authorising the expenditure class. The University of Dhaka, for example, would need approximately Tk 11 crore per year for its roughly 9,250 final-year students — about 1.1 percent of its budget — which is arithmetically possible within existing grants only with UGC concurrence. Second, the private sector must be segmented: the top tier can absorb the cost, the middle tier enters through phased capacity criteria, and the lower tier — 53 percent sector occupancy, tuition-dependent, facing a shrinking applicant pool — cannot be compelled without forcing closures or illegal fee increases; exclusion or deferral is the honest recommendation. Third, National University colleges are structurally outside the baseline: NU's per-student spending is Tk 795.55 per year, its colleges are separate fee-funded micro-institutions, and carrying them would consume 64.3 percent of NU's entire UGC transfer. Compulsory NU participation under the university-funded baseline is not a hard target; it is an impossibility, and this proposal declines to recommend it.

Recommended scope. Phase to the direct-university ceiling of approximately **130,178 participants per year** (40,000 public direct + 90,178 private across admitted tiers), with lower-tier private institutions deferred and National University colleges admitted later, voluntarily, under a separately financed model. The 300,000 figure remains a conditional Phase-4 question requiring new financing decisions by a future government.

6. Legal Framework and Legislative Pathway

The legal analysis began from the instrument most often cited in this policy space and reached a clear negative finding. The National Service Ordinance, 1970 (Ordinance No. XXII of 1970) provides for compulsory military national service by male citizens aged 18 to 20 for one year in the armed forces, with reserve liability to age 35. Its commencement clause (section 1(3)) brings the Ordinance into force only upon a day the Government appoints by Gazette notification, and no such notification has been identified in this research; one legal inventory lists the Ordinance as repealed. Even if revived, it would be unusable for this programme: it is military in character, male-only in coverage (in conflict with the equality guarantees of Constitution Articles 27 and 28), and silent on civilian university service. The conclusion is that a compulsory, gender-neutral, civilian service semester requires new primary legislation, and this proposal should not be built on the 1970 Ordinance.

The affirmative legal route is equally clear. The closest statutory template is the Philippine Republic Act No. 9163 (2001), which mandates a credit-bearing national service training programme across all tertiary institutions through a single national statute. For Bangladesh, a comparable Act of Parliament would prescribe the compulsory service component uniformly, avoiding the alternative of sixty-three sequential public-university statute amendments — a route that would take years and produce uneven results. Two existing levers support earlier, voluntary stages: the University Grants Commission Order, 1973 gives the UGC both recommendatory authority and grant-withholding power (section 5(3)) over public universities, and the Private Universities Act, 2010 reaches private universities through UGC-approved programme plans. The National Service Programme operated since 2010 by the Ministry of Youth and Sports — which places youth in government offices under an administrative, non-statutory framework — is direct domestic precedent that host placements are administratively feasible without new primary legislation for a voluntary pilot.

Instrument	Status	Relevance to the programme
National Service Ordinance, 1970	Dormant (never commenced); possibly repealed	Unusable: military, male-only, conflicts with Articles 27-28. New legislation required for compulsion
UGC Order, 1973 (P.O. No. 10 of 1973)	In force	Grant conditionality (s.5(3)) drives public universities; budget-line circular unlocks spending authority
Private Universities Act, 2010 + 2023 fee-approval regime	In force	Programme-plan approval reaches private universities; fee lock legally enforces the no-new-fees rule
National University Act, 1992	In force	NU academic council is the curriculum gateway for any later college participation
Constitution, Articles 21, 27, 28	In force	Values anchor (Art. 21); any compulsory design must be gender-neutral and equality-compliant (Arts. 27-28)
RTI Act, 2009; PIDA, 2011; ACC Act, 2004	In force	Transparency backbone; student protection; referral channels - students never exercise ACC powers
National Service Programme (2010, administrative)	Operational	Domestic precedent: government-office youth placements without primary legislation
Labour Act, 2006 (applicability question)	Unresolved	Preliminary reading: academic-credit placements are not employment; formal legal opinion required before scale-up (GAP-26)

Table. Legal instruments and their relevance

7. Integrity Architecture and Safeguards

This proposal treats the integrity dimension with more discipline than any other, because it is the dimension most easily over-claimed. The programme's contribution to integrity comes from structured presence and documentation: students observe service points against the citizen charters those offices have already published, record delays from official registers, complete and digitise non-sensitive records, check published aggregate statistics for internal consistency, and help citizens understand published procedures so that brokers become unnecessary. Nine such mechanisms are specified in the research database (AC-01 through AC-09), each with a defined student role, a named supervision responsibility, a data-collection instrument, an independent verification step and a referral route. None of them makes the student an investigator; all of them make the office's own processes more visible to its own management and to the programme's monitoring unit.

Six safeguards (SG-01 through SG-06) protect the students, the citizens and the programme itself. Retaliation protection extends Public Interest Information (Protection) Act, 2011 coverage explicitly to programme participants, backed by a designated protection officer, an anonymous grievance channel and a strict rule that no student is ever required to confront a wrongdoer. Privacy protection operates through data-access MOUs per placement, an aggregate-and-de-identified task rule and quarterly compliance audits. Impartiality protection rests on a charter of student conduct, algorithmic placement allocation and audit logs. Conflict-of-interest declarations trigger automatic re-allocation. A documentary evidentiary bar protects both

accused officials and accusing students from unfounded claims. Finally, the programme is designed against its own corruption: the Nigerian NYSC experience — where certificate fraud within the scheme forced a ministerial resignation in 2018 — is the standing warning, and the countermeasures (QR-verified digital completion certificates, biometric or digital attendance, independent spot audits, published aggregate statistics) are built in from day one rather than bolted on after the first scandal.

Honesty rule, restated for the record. No corruption-reduction savings are claimed anywhere in this proposal. The international evidence base contains no rigorous demonstration of corruption reduction from any programme of this type. Integrity outcomes are measured — through documented-irregularity statistics reported only with verification outcomes (GOV-01) and error rates in host-published aggregates (GOV-02) — and the proposal asks to be judged on those measurements.

8. Supervision, Host Capacity and Delivery Constraints

The binding constraint on this programme is trained supervisors, not buildings. At the planning ratio of one trained supervisor per twenty students, a 100,000-participant programme requires 5,000 supervisors; 200,000 requires 10,000; and 300,000 requires 15,000 — a corps equal to roughly one percent of the 1,464,350 filled government posts, which is large but not absurd. The training pipeline can be sized to meet this: a thirty-person central training unit running two-day certification courses can certify approximately 15,000 supervisors per year. University coordination requires one professional per 200 enrolled participants (500–1,500 staff across the system depending on scale), and a national programme office requires one staff member per 2,000 participants. The standing rule that governs every expansion decision is registered as RSK-09: scale never expands faster than the supervisor pipeline.

Host institution type	Verified count	Planning capacity (low-high, students/year)
Upazila complexes (UNO offices)	495	7,425 - 14,850 (15-30 per upazila)
Union Parishads	4,554 - 4,585	4,554 - 18,216 (1-4 per union)
Government primary schools	65,567	65,567 - 196,701 (1-3 per school)
Secondary institutions	19,211 - 21,086	21,086 - 63,258 (1-3 per institution)
NU college campus-based placements	2,260 - 2,500	50,000 - 250,000 (20-100 per college)
Health facilities (UHCs + district hospitals)	418 + 64	3,800 - 9,600 (8-20 per facility)
District administration (DC offices)	64	1,280 - 3,840 (20-60 per office)

Table. Verified host network and placement capacity (annual, by institution type)

Two analytical cautions accompany these numbers. The aggregate theoretical placement capacity — 155,916 to 706,465 students per year across all institution types — is exactly that: theoretical. It assumes simultaneous participation of every institution type and ignores coordination costs; the operational constraint remains supervisors and task design. And the 521,922 vacant government posts must never be cited as hosting

capacity: they are unfilled jobs, and hosting capacity is a function of supervisor availability, workspace and task design. The education sector illustrates the real structure of the constraint: 65,567 primary schools offer an enormous physical network, but head-teacher supervision capacity — not school buildings — is what bounds placements there.

9. International Evidence

Six international programmes were examined for design lessons, each verified against official or independently documented sources. Indonesia's Kuliah Kerja Nyata (KKN), institutionalised since 1973, is the closest structural model: a community-embedded, credit-bearing, in-degree service requirement that has run for over fifty years in a Muslim-majority Asian democracy, with individual universities sending thousands of students yearly (Universitas Gadjah Mada alone deploys 6,000–7,000 students to more than 400 villages each year). The Philippine National Service Training Program (Republic Act 9163) is the legal template: a national statute mandating a credit-bearing service component across the entire tertiary cohort, with a three-unit load over two semesters. Nigeria's National Youth Service Corps is the scale proof — approximately 400,000 graduates mobilised annually for fifty years — and simultaneously the central warning, having itself become a corruption object through certificate fraud. India's National Service Scheme demonstrates voluntary operation at multi-million scale (about 3.65 million volunteers across 771 universities). AmeriCorps in the United States is the governance benchmark: professional member terms, independent evaluation infrastructure and an 89 percent completion target. France's Service National Universel is the deliberation precedent — a G7 state that paused before mandating national service and proceeded voluntary-first.

Programme and country	Scale (verified)	Lesson carried into this proposal
KKN - Indonesia	Thousands per university; UGM 6,000-7,000/yr to 400+ villages	Closest model: credit-bearing, in-degree, community-embedded, 50+ years continuous operation
NSTP - Philippines (RA 9163)	Entire national tertiary cohort	Legal template: one statute mandating credit-bearing service across all institutions
NYSC - Nigeria	Approx. 400,000 mobilised annually	Scale proof and warning: certificate fraud (2018 ministerial resignation) drives the anti-fraud design (SG-06)
NSS - India	Approx. 3.65 million volunteers, 771 universities	Voluntary alternative at scale; relevant to pre-mandate uptake testing
AmeriCorps - United States	200,000+ members annually	Governance benchmark: professional terms, independent evaluation, 89% completion reference
SNU - France	Voluntary cohorts since 2019	Deliberation precedent: pilot-first pathway before any mandate

Table. International programmes and lessons for Bangladesh

One finding from this survey is stated with deliberate prominence, because the credibility of the entire proposal depends on it: none of these programmes, in fifty years of combined operation, has produced rigorous evidence of corruption reduction. There is evidence of civic-learning gains (the KKN literature), evidence of scale sustainability (NYSC), and evidence of governance quality (AmeriCorps), but no programme anywhere has demonstrated the corruption outcome that advocates of service schemes most like to promise. This proposal therefore promises nothing of the kind: it builds integrity mechanisms, measures integrity indicators, and lets the measurements speak.

10. Phased Implementation and Decision Gates

Implementation proceeds through five phases separated by four decision gates, each gate defined by published, independently evaluated criteria. No phase begins until the preceding gate has been passed on evidence, and the programme's own design gives the evaluators real power: gate failures halt expansion by rule, not by discretion. Phase 0 (twelve months) is design and legal preparation — the inter-ministerial working group, the drafting of primary legislation for the compulsory element, platform procurement, memorandum templates, task catalogues and the first institutional sign-ups, exiting with legislation drafted and ten to fifteen universities plus five upazila host offices committed. Phase 1 (two academic years) is the voluntary pilot at 5,000–10,000 students per year across ten to fifteen universities with all safeguards live. Phase 2 (two academic years) is controlled expansion to 50,000 students per year across sixty-plus universities in all eight divisions. Phase 3 (three academic years) is national scale-up to 100,000–200,000 per year. Phase 4 is the conditional target-scale operation of up to 300,000 per year, entered only if all preceding gates have passed and only with the National University participation and 15,000-supervisor corps that scale structurally requires.

Gate	Preceding phase	Exit criteria (all required)
Gate 1	PH-1 Voluntary pilot (5,000-10,000/yr)	Completion rate 85%+; no unresolved retaliation cases; duration-neutrality verified against matched peers; cost within 150% of medium estimate
Gate 2	PH-2 Controlled expansion (50,000/yr)	Completion 87%+; placement rate 95%+; unit cost declining; zero systemic data breaches
Gate 3	PH-3 National scale-up (100,000-200,000/yr)	Sustained quality indices; fraud controls verified by external audit; parliamentary review of the first five years
Standing gates	PH-4 Target scale (up to 300,000/yr)	Annual independent audit; public dashboards; sunset review every five years; supervisor pipeline never outrun (RSK-09)

Table. Decision gates and exit criteria




Figure 3. The phased implementation timeline from design (PH-0) through conditional target scale (PH-4), with decision gates between phases.

11. Monitoring, Evaluation and Reporting

The monitoring and evaluation framework specifies nineteen indicators across five families, each with a definition, a data source, a reporting frequency and a baseline note. Output indicators track enrolment, placement (target 95 percent or higher), completion (with AmeriCorps' 89 percent as the international reference), cost per completed placement, supervisor coverage (floor of one per twenty) and grievance resolution time (target thirty days). Process indicators include the single most important integrity metric in the framework: graduation delay of participants against matched non-participants, which must show duration-neutrality for the programme to be honest about its substitution promise. Further process indicators track net out-of-pocket student expense (equity), host satisfaction, supervisor workload and safety incidents per thousand students. Service-effectiveness indicators measure processing times at participating versus comparison offices, register completeness and error rates, and grievance-redress outcomes. Governance indicators (GOV-01, GOV-02) measure documented irregularities reported only with their independent verification outcomes, and error rates in host-published aggregates. Long-term impact — service quality trends, civic outcomes of participants and graduate employability — is assessed at two-to-three-year intervals by an independent evaluation unit through phased and matched designs, because attribution at scale requires comparison groups, not enthusiasm.

Reporting is public by rule. Quarterly participation and quality indices, annual independent audits and biennial independent evaluations are published, and the programme's own statistics are themselves subject to the anti-fraud architecture described in Section 7. The M&E system is budgeted within the cost model (the monitoring, evaluation and independent-audit line), and the independent evaluation unit is institutionally separated from the placement function so that evaluators never audit placements they arranged — the same Chinese-wall principle that governs the survey-enumeration mechanism (AC-08).

12. Risk Management

The research programme maintains a twenty-four-item risk register with mitigations; the eight risks most material to the decision now requested are summarised below. Two deserve explicit mention. Session-jam risk (RSK-01) is the reason the substitution rule is a design constant: any programme that lengthens time-to-degree in a system already suffering multi-year session delays would fail on its own terms, which is why duration-neutrality is a Gate 1 exit criterion rather than a monitoring afterthought. Equity risk (RSK-03) is the reason the need-based fund exists and is protected as a cost line: an unpaid programme that burdens low-income students would convert an opportunity into a regressive tax, and net out-of-pocket expense is therefore tracked as a process indicator for every cohort.

Risk	Mitigation built into the design
Graduation delay / session jam (RSK-01)	Substitution rule (no added time); duration-neutrality verified at Gate 1 against matched peers (PRO-01)
Burden on low-income students (RSK-03)	Need-based support fund (30% of participants); near-campus placement priority; net-expense tracking (PRO-02)
Supervisor pipeline collapse (RSK-09)	Standing rule: scale never expands faster than supervisor certification; coverage floor 1:20 (OUT-05)
Certificate fraud / ghost participants (SG-06; NYSC lesson)	QR-verified digital certificates; biometric or digital attendance; independent spot audits; published aggregate statistics
Retaliation against student observers (SG-01)	PIDA 2011 coverage; protection officer; anonymous grievance channel; placement rotation; oversight-committee review of every incident
Personal-data exposure (SG-02)	Data-access MOUs per placement; aggregate/de-identified tasks only; quarterly compliance audits; breach protocol
Politicisation of placements (SG-03)	Conduct charter; algorithmic allocation with audit logs; no placement in declared conflict situations
Legal misclassification as employment (LEG-12)	Preliminary reading; not employment; formal legal opinion required before scale-up; programme liability capped by MOU structure

Table. Principal risks and mitigations (from the 24-item register)

13. Recommendations and Next Steps

On the evidence assembled across four research phases, this proposal makes one recommendation and requests six decisions. The recommendation: **adopt the university-funded baseline and phase the programme to approximately 130,000 participants per year**, treating 300,000 as a conditional Phase-4 question to be decided by a future government on pilot evidence, not as a starting commitment. This recommendation follows from three verified findings: the direct-university pool is 130,178; the baseline financing rule cannot carry National University colleges; and the supervision pipeline, not money or buildings, is the binding constraint on expansion speed.

The six requested decisions, in order. First, constitute the inter-ministerial working group (Ministry of Education, University Grants Commission, Cabinet Division, Ministry of Public Administration, Ministry of Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs) to own Phase 0. Second, direct the drafting of primary legislation for the compulsory element, while authorising voluntary, credit-bearing pilots to begin immediately under existing university autonomy — the National Service Programme precedent shows administrative placement is already lawful. Third, issue the UGC budget-line circular that gives public universities spending authority for programme costs within existing grants. Fourth, approve the pilot memorandum of understanding template and the signature of ten to fifteen universities and five upazila host offices. Fifth, authorise procurement of the national placement platform (BDT 500–1,000 million build-and-run, amortised at scale). Sixth, commission the independent evaluation unit and appoint the programme protection officer from the first day of the pilot, so that Gate 1 evidence is collected by design rather than reconstructed afterwards.

A public service citizens can see, measure and trust — built one semester at a time. The programme asks for no new taxes, no new fees and no act of faith. It asks for a decision to try, at pilot scale, what fifty years of international experience proves is operationally possible, and to let published evidence decide everything after that.

Gulshan Sync Solution remains at the disposal of the Government for presentations, technical briefings and responses to questions of fact and method, and will maintain the research database underlying this proposal under version control as new data emerge through the Right to Information pathway.

Annex A: Key Verified Data

Indicator	Value	Reference period	Source
Universities (public / private / international)	173 (63 / 108 / 2)	UGC list, verified	SRC-01
Total tertiary enrolment, all sectors	4,690,876 students	2020	UGC Annual Report (SRC-05)
Annual university graduates (only verified national figure)	344,528	2021	UGC Annual Report (SRC-06)
Direct-university final-year pool	130,178 (52,651 public + 77,527 private)	Derived, mixed vintage	PL-14
300,000 shortfall vs direct pool	169,822 students	Derived	PL-15
Sanctioned / filled / vacant government posts	1,986,272 / 1,464,350 / 521,922	30 June 2025	Statistics of Government Employees (SRC-09)

Indicator	Value	Reference period	Source
BCS recommendations per cycle	1,457 - 2,805	43rd-47th cycles, 2023-26	BPSC results (SRC-08)
Annual government retirements	Approx. 40,000 (estimate)	World Bank pension review	SRC-92
Per-participant university cash cost	BDT 7,567 / 12,050 / 16,033	Model, 8 cost lines	UFM-09
Annual cost at 100,000 participants	BDT 75.67 - 160.33 crore	Model	UFM-12
Public share at 100,000	0.28 - 0.59% of Tk 10,802.21 crore system budget	FY 2025-26 revised	UFM-17; UFE-10
Supervisors required (1:20)	5,000 / 10,000 / 15,000 at 100k / 200k / 300k	Planning default	ASM-07
Government primary schools (largest host network)	65,567	Verified	SRC-87
Upazila complexes / Union Parishads	495 / 4,554-4,585	Verified	SRC-81; SRC-82
International corruption-reduction evidence	None rigorous, any programme	Survey of 6 programmes	INT-01..06; ASM-22

Table. Key indicators with values, vintages and traceable sources

Annex B: Evidence Base and Verification Statement

Every figure in this proposal is traceable to a registered source, dataset row or assumption in the four-phase research programme: 123 registered sources (SRC-001 through SRC-123) across the 2024-2026 research window, 36 datasets (CSV files 01–36), 35 registered data gaps with Right to Information request pathways (GAP-01 through GAP-35, six of which are drafted and ready to file), 32 registered planning assumptions with sensitivity notes (ASM-01 through ASM-32), and a 24-item risk register. Where a value is derived rather than counted, the derivation is registered; where data vintages differ (for example, the 2015 public-direct and 2021 private enrolment bases underpinning the final-year pool), the inconsistency is flagged and the figure is treated as an order-of-magnitude estimate; where a number is not publicly available, it is recorded as a gap and left as NA rather than imputed. No corruption-reduction savings are claimed as a benefit anywhere in the model (methodological rule ASM-22).

The companion documents submitted with this proposal are: (i) the master policy proposal (32 pages, 29 sections) containing the full analytical treatment of every section summarised here; (ii) the master research database (42-sheet Excel workbook consolidating all 36 datasets with the source, gap and assumptions registers); and (iii) the dataset series itself (36 CSV files) with its data dictionaries. The full research package, including the Phase 1 and Phase 3 research reports, is available for inspection on request, and the source registry contains the uniform resource locators and access notes required to re-verify every citation. Gulshan Sync Solution commits to maintaining this evidence base under version control and to updating the

registers as Right to Information responses close the documented gaps.